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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Working memory is our ability to maintain a limited amount of 
information for a brief period of time, even when that information is no 
longer physically present. While this ability seems fairly simple and straight 
forward, it allows us to do a wide variety of complex tasks and activities. To 
illustrate, imagine you are on the side walk of a busy street. You are hungry 
and decide to buy a sandwich at a shop across the street. To get the 
sandwich, you will need to cross the street, enter the shop, and buy the 
sandwich. To cross the street you need to keep track of traffic around you: 
cars are approaching from left and right and other people are walking on the 
sidewalk in all directions. You look to your left and see a car approaching; 
simultaneously you hear the siren of an ambulance in the distance 
approaching from the right. At this point in time you are actively 
maintaining and keeping track of; the car approaching from the left, the 
ambulance approaching from the right, the goal of buying a sandwich, and 
the plan to cross the street and enter the shop to buy it. It is easy to see how 
failures of working memory can lead to problems in daily life. It is therefore 
no surprise that working memory, and its related processes, is at the 
forefront of research in human cognition. 
The information we maintain in working memory comes from a 
wide variety of sources: sensory information (i.e., the visually perceived car 
or auditory perceived ambulance), motor action information (i.e., the 
planned action to cross the street), and long-term memory (e.g., the concepts 
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“street”, “car,” “ambulance”, and “sandwich shop”). So besides the short-
term maintenance of information, the integration of information from 
multiple sources and the creation of a coherent representation of our external 
world are an important aspect of working memory. Despite the importance 
of integrating and creating such a coherent representation, research has 
mostly focused on the storage aspect of working memory. How information 
is integrated and represented in working memory is the central theme of this 
dissertation. The first part of the current dissertation (Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3) examines how visual information is integrated and represented in working 
memory. The second part (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) explores how 
information from different senses and long-term memory representations can 
interact or integrate with each other.  
 
A brief history of Working Memory Research 
 Ever since psychology established itself as an independent 
scientific discipline, researchers have turned their attention toward human 
memory. Much of this early research compared human memory to a library 
in which information could be encoded and stored, and from which 
information could also be retrieved. In essence, this early research thrived on 
using a library metaphor of human memory, which resulted in a strong focus 
on the encoding (and subsequent forgetting) of information in memory (see 
e.g. Ebbinghaus, 1885). Moreover, most researchers at that time considered 
memory to be a single system and it was not until the late 1950s that 
memory was thought to consist of having multiple stores, out of which one 
was dedicated to the temporary storage of information (e.g., Broadbent, 
1958; Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). 
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Based on the ideas of that time, Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) 
devised a model for the flow information through multiple components in 
human memory, later known as the modal model. In their seminal work, they 
suggested that environmental information is processed in parallel by various 
sensory registers, (one for every modality, e.g., visual, or auditory) before 
they are combined and transferred into a short-term store. From the short-
term store, information can enter long-term memory, which is considered to 
be a permanent store without any capacity limits. Atkinson and Shiffrin 
(1968) regarded the short-term store to be a fundamental property of 
information flow in human memory, which set the modal model clearly apart 
from earlier attempts to explain human memory. According to the model, 
information that enters the short-term store can be retained for a limited 
amount of time determined by a set of cognitive control processes that are 
assumed to be under a person’s voluntary control. These control processes 
are encoding, rehearsal, and retrieval. For example, the contents of the short-
term store can be copied to the long-term store by way of continuous 
rehearsal of these contents. Moreover, information related to the content in 
the short-term store might be activated in the long term store and reenter the 
short-term store, by means of a retrieval process. It is this active 
manipulation of information in the short-term store that defined the term 
“working memory” as it was obviously more than just the passive storing of 
said information.  
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s modal model has been influential for a long 
time. Because of its clear structure and mathematical nature the model was 
well equipped to make specific predictions for many different paradigms. 
The rigid architecture of memory systems as suggested by Atkinson and 
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Shiffrin (1968) could, however, not account for the apparent flexibility of 
memory systems observed in for example: learning (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 
1972), neuropsychology (e.g., Shallice & Warrington, 1970), and item 
categorization (e.g., Crowder, 1979).  
Several years later, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed a multiple 
component model of working memory, which was better equipped to explain 
the flexibility of memory systems. The main component of this model is the 
central executive, which is assumed to focus attention, to update working 
memory contents, and to provide a link to long-term memory. This central 
executive is assisted by two domain-specific subsystems: the phonological 
loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. The phonological loop is used for 
short-term maintenance of speech-based and acoustic items and the visuo-
spatial sketchpad maintains visually and/ or spatially encoded items. The 
separation of working memory storage in a verbal phonological loop and a 
nonverbal visuo-spatial sketchpad was based on converging evidence 
collected from research with brain-damaged patients, and research with dual-
task paradigms in healthy patients (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). First, specific 
patterns of brain damage can show impaired memory for verbal material 
while memory for nonverbal material stays intact (e.g., Shallice & 
Warrington, 1970; Vallar & Papagno, 2002), and vice versa (e.g., Della Sala 
& Logie, 2002). Second, these patterns can be imitated with a dual-task 
paradigm and this method has successfully shown that memory for verbal 
material did not interfere with memory for visual information and vice versa 
(e.g., Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley, 2002; Logie, 
Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990). The basic premise of this type of research is that 
if two processes use the same underlying system they will compete for 
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processing resources, which will cause interference and a degradation of 
performance. Likewise, if two processes do not share a single underlying 
system, there will be no interference and hence no performance cost. 
The clear separation of the phonological loop and visuo-spatial 
sketchpad could, however, not hold up, due to the fact that evidence showed 
more interaction between the two systems than the original model would 
suggest. A fourth component was added to this model to account for the 
interactions between the two slave systems. This system, the episodic buffer, 
acts as a link between the two subsystems, and provides a link between long-
term memory and the central executive. It is a storage system that can hold 
about four chunks of information in a multidimensional code. The episodic 
buffer integrates different memory codes into a coherent perceptual scene, 
including e.g., auditory, visual, tactile, or olfactory information (Baddeley, 
2000). Although the episodic buffer can in theory explain a lot of the 
interactions found between the different slave systems, attention, and long-
term memory, and could even help to bridge the gap between research in 
working memory and multisensory integration (see Chapter 5), it is by far 
the least examined component of the working memory model.  
Although the above-discussed models are not as prominent in the 
field of cognitive science anymore, they did introduce the basis for many of 
the concepts and structures that still hold up to this day. Both models capture 
the essential role of working memory in information processing that is used 
to guide complex behavior. Moreover, both models touch on the integrative 
aspect of working memory. Atkinson and Shiffrin’s model (1968) assumes 
that information from different senses is recoded in an amodal (modality 
independent) form for subsequent maintenance in the short-term store. In 
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Baddeley and Hitch’s model, modality specific information is integrated to 
create a coherent perceptual scene in the episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000). 
Both models assume that information is maintained in a specific passive 
store or buffer and that attention is used to control what enters and exits the 
store. Recent working memory models have emhapsized this integral role 
attention in working memory encoding, maintenance, and retrieval much 
more prominently (e.g., Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 
2009). Indeed, some of these models suggest that working memory and 
attentional processes might be the same, or part of a mutual underlying 
system (Olivers, 2008; Kiyonaga & Egner, 2013; Postle, 2006). The critical 
difference between these attention based models and the before mentioned 
storage models is that the maintenance of information is achieved by 
sustained attention to relevant information instead of information being put 
in a passive storage component. 
To summarize, working memory is a complex framework of 
multiple interacting processes that involve the temporary maintenance and 
manipulation of information that guides complex cognitive behavior. After 
the initial perception of sensory information, a small amount of this 
information can be actively maintained for a brief period of time. Similarly, 
long-term memories can be activated for active manipulation through 
various control processes. Attention seems to play an essential role in 
keeping information active in memory. Although the interaction or 
integration of multiple sources of information in working memory seems an 
important part, working memory models and research have largely focused 
on examining the sources of information separately.  
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VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 
One of the defining characteristics of working memory is its limited 
capacity, that is, the limitation in the amount of information a person can 
maintain at a time. There are large individual differences in working 
memory capacity and these differences have been shown to correlate with a 
large number of factors, including fluid intelligence (Conway, Cowan, 
Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholsky, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999; Fukuda, Vogel, Mayr, & Awh, 2010), reading 
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), and academic achievement 
(Alloway and Alloway, 2010). Thus, understanding the limits of working 
memory capacity can be important in gaining insights in general cognitive 
functioning. Indeed, research over the years has focused on finding the limits 
of working memory capacity. 
One of the first to investigate the capacity of working memory was 
Miller (1956). In his seminal paper, “The magical number seven, plus or 
minus two”, Miller has described the limitations found in absolute 
judgement and immediate memory span tasks. While Millers’ paper 
specifically concerned the recoding and grouping of information in what he 
called ‘chunks’, he also mentions his fascination with what seems to be a 
returning number of on average seven items that can be maintained or 
attended to at the same time. Since then, considerable research has shown a 
constant capacity limit in a wide variety of tasks, although this limit is closer 
to four instead of Miller’s suggested seven (see for a review: Cowan, 2001). 
One important question is then: how does this capacity limit come about? 
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Visual working memory capacity limits 
This has been one of the questions driving research in visual 
working memory, our ability to temporarily maintain a representation of 
visual items in memory without the physical presence of these items. 
Research on visual working memory has led to two competing ideas that can 
explain capacity limits. The first idea is that capacity is limited by a fixed 
number of integrated objects that can be maintained regardless of the amount 
of visual information per object (Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Zhang 
& Luck, 2008). The second idea, in contrast, is that capacity is limited by a 
fixed amount of visual information, regardless of whether this information is 
distributed among multiple objects or not (Alvarez & Cavanagh. 2004; Bays 
& Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). Over the years support has been 
found for both models and is the reason why this is a major point of 
discussion in the visual working memory literature. 
Visual working memory capacity has mostly been investigated by 
using the so-called change-detection task. In this task, participants are 
presented with a memory array containing one or more visual objects, which 
they have to maintain in memory for a brief period of time. Then participants 
are again presented with an array containing one or more of the objects and 
they have to indicate whether a change has occurred, compared to the 
memory array. When the number of presented objects is low compared to an 
individual’s capacity limit, performance will be near perfect. When the 
number of objects presented exceed an individual’s capacity limit, 
performance will deteriorate systematically with each added object.  
 Using a change-detection task Luck and Vogel (1997) were among 
the first to examine visual working memory capacity for visual objects. They 
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found that participants could maintain up to four objects in working memory 
without much difficulty but that performance declined fast when the number 
of items increased beyond four, regardless of the amount of visual 
information that had be memorized per object. These findings were the basis 
for what is known as the “slot” or discrete resource model of capacity 
(Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; see for a review: Luck and Vogel, 
2013). This model assumes that a person’s capacity is limited by a fixed 
number of objects he/she can maintain simultaneously in working memory, 
which can vary slightly from person to person (Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). 
When the number of items that need to be memorized exceeds the number of 
“slots” available, a subset of items will be stored in an all or nothing 
approach, meaning either all of the information of one object is stored or 
nothing. This view has been supported by a large number of studies 
(Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011; Aw, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Ikkai, 
McChollough, & Vogel, 2010; Scolari, Vogel, & Awh, 2008; Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001; Zhang & Luck, 2008). 
Most of these studies used a typical change-detection task with a binary 
response, meaning participants indicated whether a change had occurred yes 
or no. A limitation of this approach is that it is impossible to make any 
assumption on the precision with which each item is memorized. Simply put, 
are mistakes in the task made because the target object was not in memory, 
or because the representation of the target object in memory was not precise 
enough to clearly perceive a change?  
An alternative to the discrete resource or “slot” models is provided 
by the continuous resource models (see for a review: Ma, Husain, and Bays, 
2014). These models propose that a single memory resource can be 
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distributed evenly among visually presented items and that an increasing 
number of items can be memorized at the cost of the precision or resolution 
of that item. Strong support for these models has come from studies 
employing a continuous report task, a variation of the change detection task. 
Instead of giving a binary response (a change has occurred; yes or no) 
participants are required to reproduce one of the items in memory on a 
continuous scale. By examining the discrepancy between the presented item 
and the item reproduced from memory, an estimate of the precision of that 
item’s representation in memory can be obtained. Indeed, studies that have 
employed this method generally find that the discrepancy between the 
presented item and reproduced item increases as a function of the number of 
items that have be memorized (Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Bays, 
Gorgoraptis, Wee, Marshall, & Hussain, 2011; Bays & Husain, 2008; 
Fougnie, Cormiea, Kanabar, & Alvarez, 2016; Wilken & Ma, 2004). This 
indicates that there is a possible trade-off between the number of objects and 
the precision with which these objects can be stored. 
More evidence against the view that visual working memory 
capacity is limited by a fixed number of discrete “slots” has been 
accumulated. For example, research has shown that the visual complexity of 
items can influence the maximum number of items that are stored in memory 
(e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Diamantopoulou, Poom, Klaver, & 
Talsma, 2011; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005; Luria, Sessa, Gotler, Jolicoeur & 
Dell’Acqua, 2009; Olsson & Poom, 2005). Alvarez & Cavanagh (2004) 
tested capacity limits for a wide variety of visual items and found that a 
lower number of complex items can be maintained compared to simple ones. 
While capacity was around four items for simple colored squares, capacity 
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was far lower, only two items, when the to-be-remembered items were 
random polygons or shaded 3-D cubes. These results are hard to reconcile 
with a view that assumes that there is a fixed number of items one can 
remember.  
Research on visual working memory capacity has mostly examined 
the ways in which capacity is limited. Two competing views have been 
proposed: the discrete resource view assumes that capacity is limited by a 
fixed number of objects and the continuous resource view assumes that 
capacity is limited by an upper limit in the amount of visual information that 
can be maintained. Over the years, both views have been supported by ample 
research and a clear consensus on the nature of capacity limits is yet to be 
reached. One possible way to examine this issue is by finding the exact 
circumstances under which the effects supporting one view or another arise. 
For example, currently most research using a typical binary change-detection 
task has found evidence in favor of a discrete resource view (see for a 
review: Luck & Vogel, 2013), while research using the continuous report 
paradigm has favored the continuous resource view (see for a review: Ma et 
al., 2014). Moreover, studies that found no support for the discrete resource 
view based on examining visual object complexity has mostly done so by 
comparing two or more entirely different stimulus classes (e.g., squares 
versus Chinese characters). It could be that the different capacity estimates 
between simple and complex object is the result of, for example, a difference 
in the comparison process at test for squares or Chinese characters, and not 
actual memorization of these objects. In Chapter 2 we try to address these 
questions by examining whether capacity is affected when the same visual 
objects have to be memorized in different levels of complexity.  
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Visual working memory content 
  One other way to examine how information is represented in 
working memory is by trying to deduct what the contents of working 
memory are. Can we define a ‘unit’ in which information is stored in 
working memory? For example, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) assumed that 
visual information was stored as a visual representation in the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad while verbal information was stored in a verbal code in the 
phonological loop. Moreover, visual information can be recoded in a verbal 
code and verbal information can be visualized in a visual representation. 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) on the other hand assumed that all sensory 
information was recoded in an amodal code, meaning that the form in which 
sensory information is stored is independent of its original modality. Cowan 
(2001) proposed that information is stored in the form of chunks, which 
assumes that information can be bound in an integrated representation which 
can in turn be cross-modal (exist of multiple modalities) in nature. Similar to 
the idea of chunks, in visual working memory research has focused on 
whether visual information is stored as separate visual features or as 
integrated visual objects. Visual features are considered to be the basic 
building blocks of visual objects. To illustrate, a horizontal blue bar is an 
object which consists of the following visual features: color (blue), shape 
(height and width), and orientation (90º). Intuitively, it would make sense 
that we would memorize visual information as integrated objects however 
research is currently divided on this topic. 
 Akin to the debate on the limits of visual working memory 
capacity, the debate on whether we memorize separate features or integrated 
objects has been instigated by the study of Luck & Vogel (1997). They 
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instructed participants to memorize one or more features (feature load) of 
one or multiple objects (object load) and found that memory for objects with 
up to four relevant features was as good as memory for objects with only a 
single relevant feature. Since visual working memory performance was 
largely unaffected by the number of features that had to be memorized per 
object suggested that objects, and not features, are the main unit of visual 
working memory. This finding has been replicated in multiple studies (e.g., 
Luria & Vogel, 2011; Vogel et al., 2001; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). In 
contrast, several studies have found an effect of feature load on visual 
working memory performance when features that had to memorized came 
from the same feature dimension (e.g., memorizing two different colors of 
one object, Olson & Jiang, 2002; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002).  
For example, Wheeler and Treisman (2002) presented participants 
with objects consisting of one or multiple (up to six) different colors. They 
found no difference in performance between memorizing one object with 
multiple colors or the same number of objects with a single color. When 
memorized features came from different feature dimensions, however, 
similar results to Luck and Vogel (1997) were found. Based on these 
findings, they suggest a framework in which different feature dimensions are 
memorized in their own domain-specific stores. An additional store can 
maintain the binding of these features, when the task requires it. Since the 
features used in a typical change-detection task are selected from different 
feature dimensions, this framework may explain why object load and not 
feature load influences working memory performance in these studies.  
Recently, evidence has been provided, which shows that feature load 
can affect visual working memory performance even when the to-be-
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remembered features are from different feature dimensions (Fougnie, 
Asplund, & Marois, 2010; Hardman & Cowan, 2015; Oberauer & 
Eichenberger, 2013; Palmer, Boston, & Moore, 2015; Vergauwe & Cowan, 
2015; Wilson, Adamo, Barense, & Ferber, 2012). In one study, Oberauer & 
Eichenberger (2013) used novel multi-feature objects that could change on 
six different feature dimensions (shape, color, size, orientation of thick 
stripes, thickness of thick striped, and the spatial frequency of thin stripes). 
Using a change detection task, they found that accuracy decreased from one 
to three features remembered per object and decreased even further from 
three to six features. This effect was present even when objects were 
simplified (only 4 features instead of 6), when changes on test were big or 
small, when response was binary or semi-continuous (8 option forced 
choice), and when items were presented for short and long time periods. 
Similarly, in an impressive effort to replicate Luck and Vogel’s (1997) 
original findings, Hardman and Cowan (2015) found an effect of feature 
load using the exact procedure as the original study. It is important to note 
that although they found an effect of feature load they also found a big effect 
of object load on working memory performance. This seems to indicate that 
both integrated object and separate feature information is maintained in 
visual working memory (see also, Fougnie et al., 2010). 
The discrepancy in the literature regarding the influence of feature 
load on VWM capacity can possibly be explained by a crucial difference in 
the stimuli that were used in each study. Authors reporting effects of objects, 
but not of features, typically only used stimuli consisting of feature 
combinations that are difficult to process independently of each other (Luck 
& Vogel, 1997; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Vogel et al., 2001; Woodman & 
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Vogel, 2008). For example, the stimuli used by Luck & Vogel (1997) were 
relatively simple objects, consisting of bars of different colors and shapes. 
Processing the orientation of such a colored bar depends on the shape of that 
bar, which might encourage automatic feature binding. Because the different 
features occupy the same spatial area, a form of obligatory binding can 
occur, minimizing the effects of feature load. Moreover, studies that have 
found effects of feature load did not manipulate object load (Fougnie et al., 
2010; Oberauer & Eichenberger, 2013; Palmer et al., 2015). In Chapter 3 we 
investigate in which form visual information is stored in working memory by 
manipulating both object load and feature load in a change detection task 
with multi-feature items. Moreover, to examine the effect of feature load 
during memorization we recorded simultaneous EEG 
(Electroencephalogram) in a second experiment. 
Electrophysiology of visual working memory 
An important advance in the study of visual working memory 
capacity research is the discovery of the lateralized event-related potential 
(ERP) component, known as the Contralateral Delay Activity (CDA, also 
known as the Contralateral Negative Slow Wave, CNSW, or Sustained 
Posterior Contralateral Negativity, SPCN). Klaver, Talsma, Wijers, Heinze, 
and Mulder (1999) found that when presenting an object to a participant in a 
certain hemifield an ERP slow wave appeared in posterior brain areas 
contralateral to the presented stimulus. It is important to note here is that this 
slow wave only appeared when participants were instructed to memorize the 
presented object and that this wave persisted throughout memorization. They 
suggested that the increase in ERP negativity reflected an enhancement of 
the visual information that had to be memorized. 
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Machizawa and Vogel (2004) expanded on this finding by 
examining ERP negativity with a bi-lateral version of the change detection 
task. In this task participants are presented with two different sample areas in 
each hemifield and are then instructed to only memorize the array in one 
specified hemifield. This allowed them to examine the moment of 
memorization in the retention interval and to isolate ERP activity of the 
attended side from the unattended side. By subtracting the ipsilateral 
activation from the contralateral activation they created a difference wave. 
The assumption was that noise in the EEG signal would mostly be present on 
both the ipsilateral and contralateral side while the memory related activity 
would only be present on the contralateral side. The subtraction will cancel 
out the noise signal leaving a ‘clean’ representation of the memory related 
activity. Using this method they found that CDA negativity increased 
linearly with an increase in object load until an individual’s capacity limit is 
reached. Looking at the increase in CDA amplitude between 2 and 4 item 
arrays, they found a high correlation between the amplitude increase and an 
individual’s calculated capacity. High capacity individuals showed a much 
larger amplitude increase than low capacity individuals. McCollough, 
Machizawa, and Vogel (2007) further explored the properties of the CDA 
and found that the CDA was more negative over recording sites contralateral 
to the memorized stimulus than over the ipsilateral recording sites, but that 
this difference became smaller near the end of the retention interval (700-
900ms). This smaller difference was due to ipsilateral activity becoming 
more negative and is thought to represent a later processing of relevant 
information in the ipsilateral hemisphere. More importantly, they found that 
CDA negativity increased with object load and not the spatial distribution of 
the objects, suggesting that the CDA is actively tracking the number of 
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objects in memory and not the overall area remembered. Taken together, 
these findings show that the CDA is exceptionally suited to examine both the 
limits and the contents of visual working memory. 
Indeed, since then, the CDA has been used to examine a wide 
variety of topics in visual working memory (see for a review: Luria, 
Balaban, Awh & Vogel, 2016). Relevant for the current dissertation, only a 
couple of studies have examined the impact of memorizing individual 
features on CDA negativity thus far. Similar to the behavioral studies 
mentioned above, results have been mixed. For example, Woodman and 
Vogel (2008) found that CDA amplitude was not affected by feature load, 
although Luria and Vogel (2011) did find an increase in CDA amplitude for 
feature load. This increase in amplitude was only present in the initial part of 
the CDA (between 450-600 ms post stimulus presentation) and only when 
the to-be-remembered features were from the same feature dimension. 
Wilson et al. (2012), however, found an increase in CDA amplitude driven 
by feature load in a situation where the to-be-remembered features were 
from different feature dimensions. Much like the mixed behavioral results 
mentioned earlier, the discrepancy in results can be the product of using 
different stimuli in different studies.  
In sum, the CDA is a useful tool to examine visual working memory 
processes during the memorization of visual information. Although the 
evidence is mixed, some studies did find that the CDA can also reflect 
effects of feature load (Luria & Vogel, 2011; Wilson et al., 2012). In Chapter 
3 we examine CDA negativity for multi-feature objects that are known to 
elicit a feature load effect in order to gain new insights into the contents of 
visual working memory. 
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OUTLINE OF THE CURRENT DISSERTATION 
The aim of the current dissertation is to examine the integrative 
properties of working memory, both within and across modalities. Having 
established that working memory may be involved in integrating information 
within a single modality as well as across modalities, we first turn our 
attention to the integrative properties of working memory within the visual 
modality.  
In Chapter 2, we examine the question to what degree we can 
control the level of detail with which we can memorize visual stimuli and if 
precision can be traded in for more capacity to memorize additional objects. 
This question was addressed using a change detection task in which one or 
more visual objects had to be memorized. Participants were instructed to 
memorize these objects at one of three possible levels of detail. Estimates of 
working memory capacity indicated that memorizing objects at higher levels 
of detail resulted in a reduction of the number of objects, which could be 
memorized. In addition, change detection accuracy was affected by both the 
number of objects memorized as well as the amount of detail memorized per 
object. The absence of an interaction between the number of objects and the 
precision of objects, suggests that the number of objects and the amount of 
detail impacted capacity independently.  
In Chapter 3, we examine the effect of feature load on visual 
working memory capacity, change detection sensitivity, and posterior slow 
wave ERP activity. Participants memorized arrays of one, or multiple, multi-
feature objects and had to report whether one of the objects had changed 
after a short retention interval. Objects could change on a pre-indicated 
 INTRODUCTION     31 
relevant feature. In the two experiments we conducted, we found that visual 
working memory capacity was significantly impacted by feature- as well as 
object load, but found no interactions between these factors, again 
suggesting that object and feature load modulated working memory capacity 
independently. Moreover, we observed a discrepancy between lateralized 
EEG activity that is sensitive to the number of objects memorized and 
bilateral EEG activity that is more sensitive to the number of features 
memorized per object. 
Following the discussion of integrative properties within the visual 
modality, we shift our focus to studying these processes across modalities. 
Although our sensory experience is mostly multisensory in nature, research 
on working memory representations has focused mainly on examining the 
senses in isolation. Results from the multisensory processing literature make 
it clear that the senses interact on a more intimate manner than previously 
assumed. These interactions raise questions regarding the manner in which 
multisensory information is maintained in working memory.  
In Chapter 4, we examine whether an auditory context can 
influence the spatial processing and subsequent recall of serially presented 
visual items in working memory. To do so, we employed a 4-item Sternberg 
task with visually presented Chinese characters. There were three types of 
auditory context that could coincide with visual stimulus presentation: a 
monotone, ascending, or random tone context. We found that processes 
responsible for the spatial recoding of nonverbal items in serial order 
working memory can be influenced by an irrelevant auditory context under 
certain circumstances. It seems that the auditory context needed to facilitate 
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this repositioning has to consist of informative and predictable auditory 
stimuli. 
In Chapter 5, we discuss the current status of research on 
multisensory processing and the implications of these findings on our 
theoretical understanding of working memory. We focus on reviewing 
working memory research conducted from a multisensory perspective, and 
discuss the relation between working memory, attention, and multisensory 
processing in the context of the predictive coding framework. We argue that 
complex representations seem to be formed in working memory, consisting 
of the integration of several independent representations that can be sensory, 
and short- or long-term memory activations. Depending on task 
requirements either just the simple modal representation or the complex 
high-resolution binding of several features at once will become active.  
Finally, in the general discussion, we will discuss the implications 
of our findings on working memory research and current working memory 
models. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
VISUAL WORKING MEMORY VARIES WITH INCREASED 
ENCODING DETAIL OF COMPLEX OBJECTS
1 
A major ongoing debate in visual working memory research concerns the 
question whether the number of objects or the amount of total information that 
can be stored limits visual working memory capacity. The object-limited view 
assumes that a fixed number of objects can be maintained in an all or nothing 
approach. The information-limited view, on the other hand, assumes that a 
varying number of objects can be maintained dependent on the precision with 
which these objects are encoded. Here, we examine whether the visual 
complexity of an object can affect the number of objects stored in working 
memory. Specifically, we wanted to examine whether capacity was affected 
when the same objects had to be memorized with varying levels of detail. 
Participants memorized arrays of one or more complex objects and had to 
report whether one of the objects had changed on a relevant dimension after a 
short retention interval. Change relevance was determined by the task 
instruction received at the beginning of a block. We found that visual working 
memory capacity was significantly impacted by the amount of detail that had to 
be memorized per object. In addition, change detection accuracy was affected 
by both the number of objects memorized as well as the amount of detail 
memorized per object. Moreover, results suggest that the precision of encoding 
is under voluntary control to a certain degree. These findings are discussed in 
light of the above-mentioned views on the emergence of capacity limits. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Quak, M., Bigler, A., & Talsma, D. (in preperation). Visual working memory varies 
with increased encoding detail of complex objects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Visual short-term memory, also known as visual working memory, is 
our ability to temporarily maintain a representation of visual items in memory 
without the physical presence of these items. For example, when playing a game 
of cards with friends we are able to maintain the specific cards we currently 
have in our hands without actively looking at them. This ability enables us to 
watch the moves of our friends and plan our own turn while they play their 
cards. When we hold more and more cards in our hands it becomes more 
difficult to keep these cards in memory. The number of items we can store in 
working memory has been estimated to be around 3 to 4 items (Cowan, 2001; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). The capacity of our 
working memory is subject to individual differences (Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004) and is highly correlated with a wide variety of cognitive functions, such 
as general intelligence, academic career, and reading comprehension (e.g., 
Alloway and Alloway, 2010; Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 
2002; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). It is therefore very important to understand 
how these capacity limits come about. There are currently two competing ideas 
that can explain capacity limits. The first idea is that capacity is object-limited, 
that is, we can store a fixed number of objects in memory, regardless of the 
information density per object (Luck & Vogel, 1997, Cowan, 2001, Zhang & 
Luck, 2008). The second idea, in contrast, is that capacity is information-
limited. More specifically, this idea states that capacity is limited by a fixed 
amount of visual information, regardless of whether this information is 
distributed among multiple objects or not (Alvarez & Cavanagh. 2004; Bays & 
Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). Over the years support has been found for 
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both models and is the reason why this is a major point of discussion in the 
visual working memory literature. 
 Visual working memory capacity has mostly been investigated by 
using the so-called change detection task: Participants are presented with a set 
of objects, which they have to subsequently memorize. Then participants are 
presented with another set of objects and they have to indicate whether a change 
has occurred in this new set of objects, compared to the initially presented set. 
This task is fairly simple and assumes that as long as the capacity limits of the 
working memory system are not reached, change-detection performance will be 
good. When this limit is reached, for example by increasing the size of the set of 
objects presented, detection performance will deteriorate. 
 Using this task, Luck and Vogel (1997) were the first to show that 
participants could maintain, on average, up to four objects. When the number of 
objects was increased beyond four, performance dropped systematically with 
each added object. Moreover, changing the amount of visual information that 
had to be memorized per object (e.g., memorize the color of an object or 
memorize the shape, color, and rotation of an object) had no impact on working 
memory performance. This led to the view that visual information is memorized 
in the form of bound objects and that memory capacity is limited by a fixed 
number of objects you can memorize (Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; see 
for a review: Luck & Vogel, 2013). This view has been supported by a large 
number of studies (Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011; Aw, Barton, & Vogel, 
2007; Ikkai, McChollough, & Vogel, 2010; Scolari, Vogel, & Awh, 2008; 
Vogel & Machizawa, 2004; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001; Zhang & Luck, 
2008). Most of these studies have used the detection of relatively large changes, 
for example, a red square changing into a blue square instead of a red square 
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changing into a slightly different shade of red square. A notable limitation of 
this approach is that it makes it difficult to draw inferences about the precision 
with which each object is maintained. 
 A pure object-limited view of working memory capacity assumes 
that objects in working memory are always stored in their entirety in an all or 
nothing approach. This position has been challenged, however, in a series of 
studies that examine the precision of object representations in working memory. 
These studies have reported evidence for the view that the amount of 
information that is memorized per object can in fact vary and that this in turn 
can affect the number of objects that can be memorized (Bays, Catalao, & 
Husain, 2009; Bays, Gorgoraptis, Wee, Marshall, & Hussain, 2011; Bays & 
Husain, 2008; Fougnie, Cormiea, Kanabar, & Alvarez, 2016; Wilken & Ma, 
2004;). The task used in these studies was a modified version of the change 
detection task. Here, instead of issuing a binary response (i.e. by stating that a 
change has occurred or not), participants are required to reproduce a specific 
aspect (e.g., color) of one or more of the objects during test. For example, by 
examining the discrepancy between the actual color of the object and the one 
reproduced from the participants’ memory, an estimate of the precision of that 
item’s representation in working memory can be obtained. It has been shown 
this discrepancy increases as a function of the number of objects that have be 
memorized (Bays et al., 2009; Bays et al., 2011; Bays & Husain, 2008; Fougnie 
et al., 2016; Wilken & Ma, 2004). Thus, it appears that there is a trade-off 
between the number of objects and the precision with which these objects can 
be stored. Moreover, this trade-off appears to be under strategic control 
(Fougnie et al., 2016). In other words, participants can choose to memorize 
more objects in a less precise way, or the other way around. These studies show 
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strong support for the view that capacity is information and not object-limited: 
There is no fixed number of objects we can store but with each added object in 
memory the representation of these objects becomes less and less precise. 
 Over the years evidence for both views has been accumulating with 
a clear winner far out of reach. For example, studies that have used a binary 
change detection task in which a participants’ expectancy of change magnitude 
was manipulated gave mixed results. A number of studies have shown that the 
visual complexity of the memorized items in itself can influence working 
memory capacity (e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Diamantopoulou, Poom, 
Klaver, & Talsma, 2011; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005; Luria, Sessa, Gotler, 
Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 2009; Olsson & Poom, 2005). For example, Alvarez & 
Cavanagh (2004) tested capacity limits for a wide variety of visual items and 
found that a lower number of complex items can be maintained compared to 
simple ones. While capacity was around four items for simple colored squares, 
capacity was far lower, only two items, when the to-be-remembered items were 
random polygons or shaded 3-D cubes. Studies examining object complexity 
have mostly done this by comparing capacity for one group of visual items 
(e.g., simple colored squares) to capacity for a different group of visual items 
(e.g., random polygons). Although these studies did point to a trade-off between 
capacity and stimulus complexity, they did not address the question to what 
degree the level of detail in memorization is under voluntary control. Results 
addressing the latter question using a binary change detection task are mixed. 
Some studies did find evidence that participants could strategically change the 
precision with which they memorized objects (Gao, Yin, Xu, Shui, & Shen, 
2010; Machizawa, Goh, and Driver, 2012) while others did not (Murray, Nobre, 
Astle, & Stokes, 2012; He, Zhang, Li, & Guo, 2015; Ye, Zhang, Liu, Li, & Liu, 
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2014). Given these discrepancies, it remains to be determined whether 
participants can indeed voluntarily choose to memorize objects in a more or less 
precise fashion.  
The aim of the current study was to do so by examining whether the 
visual complexity of an object can affect the number of objects stored in 
working memory. Specifically, we wanted to examine whether capacity was 
affected when the same objects had to be memorized with varying levels of 
detail. We did so by varying the amount of detail participants were instructed to 
memorize. This was accomplished by creating novel stimuli that could be varied 
and memorized at three levels of detail. Each visual stimulus consisted of six 
squares in a random configuration within a 3 by 4 square grid. Of these six 
squares, three random squares would always be white and the remaining three 
squares would have the same random color. The distribution of white and 
colored squares created a unique checkerboard like pattern. These visual objects 
were used in a typical change-detection task with a varying set size of 1 to 4 
objects. Participants were instructed at the beginning of each block to memorize 
either: 1) the shape, 2) the shape and the color, or 3) the shape, the color, and 
the spatial distribution of white and colored squares of each object (or pattern). 
We specifically analyzed the capacity estimates (Cowan’s K) per level of detail 
and accuracy measures to examine the interaction between the level of detail 
and the number of objects that had to be memorized. If capacity is limited by a 
fixed number of objects regardless of visual complexity, we would expect no 
difference in capacity measures (Cowan’s K) between the different levels of 
detail. Moreover, we would expect accuracy to only be affected by the number 
of objects that had to be memorized and not by the level of detail with which 
these objects had to be memorized. If, on the other hand, capacity is limited by a 
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fixed amount of visual information, regardless of how this is divided over 
objects, we would expect that capacity measures (Cowan’s K) do change as a 
function of the amount of detail that had to be memorized. Also, we would 
expect that both the number of objects as well as the amount of detail 
memorized affects accuracy. 
Additionally, to incentivize participants to process the entire object, 
regardless of the amount of detail they were instructed to memorize, all separate 
dimensions of an object could change on test. Traditionally in a change-
detection test when parts of an object are designated as ‘relevant’ only the 
relevant part will change or not (cf. Luck & Vogel, 1997). In the current study 
all dimensions of an object could change between the sample and test array. For 
example, when participants were instructed to memorize the shape of the object 
if a change would occur not only the shape could change but also the color or 
pattern could change. If a change occurred only one of the possible dimensions 
would change per trial. Participants were instructed to only respond ‘change’ 
when a relevant dimension changed (e.g., the shape changed when instructed to 
memorize shape) and ‘no change’ when an irrelevant aspect changed (e.g., the 
color, pattern, or nothing changed). One study by Awh et al. (2007) has shown 
that sample-test similarity and not necessarily visual complexity can account for 
differences in capacity found between simple and complex objects.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-three undergraduate students (age 18 – 25) participated in this 
study in exchange for course credit. All participants gave informed consent and 
reported having normal color vision and normal or corrected-to-normal 
eyesight. 
 
Materials 
The experiment was programmed in OpenSesame using the PsychoPy 
back-end (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012; Peirce, 2007). All memory 
arrays that were used in the change detection task (see below) consisted of one 
to four multi-feature objects. Objects were presented on a gray background in a 
12° by 8° area surrounding fixation. Objects were randomly assigned to a 
location in one of the four quadrants of the larger area. Objects could vary along 
three different dimensions; shape (the configuration of six squares within a 3x4 
square grid), color (three of the squares were given the same color randomly 
selected from the colors available), and pattern (the configuration of the three 
colored and three white squares within the shape). Each object was created 
online and consisted of a random configuration of six squares within a 3x4 grid 
of visual angle 3.2° by 2.8°. Of the six squares in an object, three were given the 
same color randomly selected from a fixed color set (red "#FF0000", orange 
"#FF6A00", yellow "#FFD800", light green "#B6FF00", green "#4CFF00", blue 
"#00FFFF", light blue "#0094FF", dark blue "#0026FF", purple "#B200FF", 
violet "#E100DC" and pink "#E1006E").  The other squares were white. 
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Colored and white squares where randomly placed within the shape 
configuration to create a spatial distribution. For every trial objects were 
randomly generated from the feature options available. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example change-detection trial sequence and possible stimulus 
change. (A) Each trial started with an initial fixation period for 500 ms. A 
memory array with one or multiple objects was presented for 1000 ms followed 
by a blank retention interval for 1000ms. The test array containing one of the 
objects from the memory array was shown until response. Participants indicated 
whether a change had occurred on the instructed dimension(s). (B) There were 4 
possible changes between sample and test: no change, a shape change, color 
change, or pattern change. 
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Procedure 
Participants were seated behind a personal computer approximately 60 
centimeters in front of the monitor. The task started with general instructions 
explaining the task. Before each block participants were instructed to memorize 
the shape, the shape and color, or the shape, color, and pattern of the objects. 
Each block started with sixteen practice trials. Each trial started with a fixation 
cross in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. A memory array was presented for 
1000 ms, which was followed by a 1000 ms retention interval in which no 
stimuli were presented. After the retention interval the response display was 
presented until participants made their response (see Figure 1A for an overview 
of the trial sequence). During the response display one of the earlier presented 
objects would be repeated with one of four possible changes; a shape change, 
color change, pattern change, or no-change (see Figure 1B for an example of 
possible dimension changes). The memorization condition (memorize shape, 
shape and color, and shape, color, and pattern) determined whether a specific 
change was relevant (e.g., a shape or color change in the memorize shape and 
color condition) or irrelevant (e.g., a color, pattern, or no-change in the 
memorize shape condition; see Table 1 for an overview of memorization 
conditions and the distribution of relevant and irrelevant changes). Responses 
were made on a keyboard by pressing either the ‘z’ or ‘m’ key to report a 
relevant or irrelevant change, respectively. The stimulus response mapping 
switched halfway through the experiment and was counterbalanced between 
participants. After response a white or red fixation dot was shown for 500 ms to 
indicate correct or incorrect answers respectively. 
The three different memorization conditions were administered in 
separate blocks in a random order for each participant. There were a total of 192 
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trials in every memorization condition of which half of the trials were change 
trials.  
Table 1 Overview of memorization conditions, types of change, and distribution 
over trials  
Memorize Type of change # of trials Change relevancy 
Shape Shape 96 Relevant 
Color 32 Irrelevant 
 Pattern 32 
No change 32 
Shape and color Shape 48 Relevant 
 Color 48 
Pattern 48 Irrelevant 
 No change 48 
All Shape 32 Relevant 
 Color 32 
Pattern 32 
No change 96 Irrelevant 
 
Analyses 
To investigate the overall impact of memorizing more detail on working 
memory capacity we calculated Cowan’s K. Cowan’s K was calculated by 
(proportion hits – proportion false alarms) * set size (Cowan, 2001) for each 
participant for each memorization condition. Maximum K values were used as 
the capacity estimate per participant per memorization condition. In cases where 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated 
degrees of freedom were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
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RESULTS 
Cowan’s K 
Mean K for all conditions are shown in Figure 2. A one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA on Detail (shape, shape and color, or shape, color and 
pattern) shows that K decreased significantly when more detail had to be 
memorized per object, F(2, 44) = 5.080, p <.010, ηp² = .188. Within subject 
contrasts revealed that K was significantly higher when memorizing shape 
compared to shape, color, and pattern F(1, 22) = 10.322, p <.004, ηp² = .319. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant difference between memorizing 
shape, and memorizing shape and color (p=.241) and between memorizing 
color and shape and memorizing shape, color and pattern (p =.703). 
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Figure 2. The effect of amount of detail (shape, shape and color, shape, color, 
and pattern) memorized per object on Cowan’s K. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean. 
 
Accuracy 
The average accuracy for all conditions is shown in Figure 3. 
Differences in accuracy were analyzed in a 3 (Detail: shape, shape and color, or 
shape, color, and pattern) x 4 (Set size: 1, 2, 3, or 4) x 2 (Change: relevant, or 
irrelevant) repeated measures ANOVA. A significant main effect of Set size 
was observed, F(3, 66) =122.911, p < .000, ηp² = .848. Accuracy decreased with 
an increase in Set size from 1 to 4 objects. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
change detection accuracy decreased significantly when more objects needed to 
be remembered from 1 to 2 objects ( p < .000), from 2 to 3 objects (p < .000), 
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and from 3 to 4 objects (p = .002). There was also a significant main effect of 
Detail, F(2, 44) = 7.332, p <.002, ηp² = .250. Accuracy decreased when more 
detail of an object was memorized, from memorizing shape to shape and color 
(p= .003), and from shape to shape, color, and pattern (p =.035) but not from 
shape and color to shape, color, and pattern (p=.585). No significant effect of 
Change was observed, average accuracy was the same for relevant change and 
irrelevant change trials. The interaction between Detail and Change was 
significant (Figure 3B), F(2, 44) = 5.733, p <.006, ηp² = .207. Contrasts revealed 
that accuracy for irrelevant change trials was significantly lower compared to 
relevant change trials but only when memorizing the shape and color of objects, 
F(1, 22) = 12.320, p <.002, ηp² = .359. There was no difference in relevant 
change and irrelevant change trials when memorizing either the shape, or the 
shape, color, and pattern of an object, F(1, 22) < 1. We also observed a 
significant interaction between Set size and Change, F(3, 66) = 3.707, p <.035, 
ηp² = .144. Visual inspection suggests a difference between relevant change and 
irrelevant change trials, but only when memorizing four objects, where accuracy 
is lower on irrelevant change trials. The interaction between Detail and Set size 
was not significant (Figure 3A), F(6, 132) = 1.507, p <.181, ηp² = .064. The 3-
way interaction between Detail, Set size, and Change was also not significant, 
F(6, 132) = 1.162, p <.331, ηp² = .050. 
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Figure 3. Behavioral results: (A) The effect of amount of Detail (shape, shape 
and color, shape, color, and pattern) memorized per object, and set size (1 to 4) 
on proportion correct. (B) The effect of amount of detail (shape, shape and 
color, shape, color, and pattern) memorized per object, and Change (relevant or 
irrelevant) on proportion correct. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
To further examine the interactions of the different changes on change 
detection performance we conducted an additional analysis of memorization 
detail and the type of change. Because there was an unequal amount of trials for 
each change in each condition we randomly selected an equal number of trials 
for each condition. This left 32 trials per condition for the 2-way analysis. 
Average accuracy for Detail and Change are shown in Figure 4. There was a 
significant main effect of Detail, F(2, 44) = 5.826, p <.006, ηp² = .209. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that accuracy was significantly higher when memorizing 
shape only, compared to memorizing shape and color (p < .015), or shape, 
color, and pattern (p < .032). There was no difference between the shape and 
color, and the shape, color and pattern condition (p < 1). A significant main 
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effect of Change was observed, F(33, 66) = 30.943, p <.000, ηp² = .584. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that change detection accuracy was higher when 
color changed compared to a shape change (p < .000), a detail change (p < 
.000), and no-change (p < .002). Change detection accuracy was worse when 
the pattern changed compared to a color change (p < .000) or no-change (p < 
.000), and showed a trend towards significance compared to a shape change (p 
< .086). There was no difference in accuracy between a shape change and no-
change (p < .375). There was a significant interaction between Detail and 
Change, F(6, 132) = 13.278, p <.000, ηp² = .376. When looking at a shape 
change compared to no-change for all three memorization conditions, the 
distribution is somewhat the same across conditions, accuracy for shape change 
and no-change conditions are better when only memorizing shape compared to 
memorizing shape and color, and shape, color and pattern. When looking at the 
color and detail change conditions an interesting pattern emerges. In the 
memorize shape condition, a color change is irrelevant and does not affect 
memory performance. When memorizing shape and color, a color change 
becomes a relevant change and accuracy for detecting a color change is much 
higher compared to a shape change or no-change. Color change detection 
improves even more when shape, color, and pattern had to be memorized. For 
detail the opposite seems to occur, when memorizing shape only, just like a 
color change a detail change is irrelevant and does not affect change detection 
performance. However, when memorizing shape and color, an irrelevant detail 
change affects performance drastically and performance drops even more when 
memorizing shape, color, and detail, where detail is a relevant change.  
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Figure 4. The effect of amount of detail (shape, shape and color, shape, color, 
and pattern) memorized per object, and test change (shape, color, pattern, and 
no change) on proportion correct. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56     CHAPTER 2 
DISCUSSION 
The current study aimed to examine whether the visual complexity of 
an object can affect the number of objects stored in working memory. 
Specifically, we wanted to examine whether capacity was affected when the 
same objects had to be memorized with varying levels of detail. Participants 
memorized arrays of one or more complex objects and had to report whether 
one of the objects had changed on a relevant dimension after a short retention 
interval. Change relevancy was determined by the task instruction received at 
the beginning of a block. Participants were instructed to memorize the shape, 
the shape and color, or the shape, color, and pattern of the same objects. The 
main finding of the current study was that visual working memory capacity was 
significantly impacted by the amount of detail that had to be memorized per 
object. In addition, change detection accuracy was affected by both the number 
of objects memorized as well as the amount of detail memorized per object. 
There was no significant interaction between the two factors, suggesting both 
the number of objects and the amount of detail impacted capacity 
independently.  
The results of the current study are in agreement with studies that have 
shown that the same objects can be memorized with varying precision and that 
this precision, in turn, can impact the number of objects that can be memorized 
(Bays et al., 2009; Bays et al., 2011; Bays & Husain, 2008; Fougnie et al., 2016; 
Wilken & Ma, 2004). Our results also agree with studies that have shown that 
the visual complexity of an item can impact capacity (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 
2004; Diamantopoulou et al., 2011; Eng et al., 2005; Luria et al., 2009; Olsson 
& Poom, 2005), but extend the latter findings, by showing that this trade-off 
between level-of-detail and number of items can be strategically controlled. The 
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novel finding in our study was that participants were instructed to memorize 
these objects in differing levels of detail, and that it was this instruction that 
caused the above-described differences in capacity estimates. Thus, our results 
suggest that participants were able to control the precision with which they 
memorized the same objects in a top-down manner (cf., Gao et al., 2010; 
Fougnie et al., 2016; Machizawa et al., 2012).  
Our results are clearly incompatible with a pure object-limited account 
of visual working memory. The object-limited account states that capacity is 
limited by a fixed number of bound objects that can be stored in visual working 
memory, because all information of an object would have been bound and 
stored together regardless of the relevancy of that information (Cowan, 2001; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997). As such, the object-limited account would predict that 
the same number of objects can be retained in memory in each and every 
condition. Because of this obligatory binding of information, a pure object-
limited account would predict that participants are unable to strategically 
control the precision with which the same items are stored. The results of the 
current study do not support this view. 
It is important to note here that this pure version of the object-limited 
account has made way for an updated version, known as the slot + averaging 
model (Zhang & Luck, 2008). Employing the same methods as Wilken and Ma 
(2004), i.e. by requiring participants to reproduce one specific feature of a 
memorized object, Zhang and Luck (2008) found evidence that was compatible 
with a modified version of the object-limited account. More specifically, they 
did find a fixed upper limit of three objects that could be memorized 
simultaneously; a finding that is consistent with the object-limited account. 
Extending this finding, however, Zhang and Luck (2008) also found that the 
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precision of the representation in memory decreased as a function of the number 
of items retained memory. This decrease in reproduction precision is 
incompatible with the object-limited account, but does fit with an information-
limited account. To explain these findings Zhang and Luck concluded that 
capacity is limited by a fixed amount of discrete slots but that when only one 
item is memorized, copies of the single item are made and stored in the 
remaining slots, thereby increasing the precision of the representation of that 
item. Our data are compatible with such a view and based on the data we cannot 
fully differentiate between the information-limited explanation and the slot + 
averaging explanation.  
Despite the impact of increased detail memorization on capacity we 
also still found a major impact of the number of objects stored on change 
detection accuracy. This finding suggests that both the number of objects and 
the amount of detail per object can limit visual working memory. Furthermore, 
the lack of an interaction between the two might indicate that they both impose 
a limit on working memory capacity in their own way. Indeed, over the years, 
some research groups have suggested a hybrid view of capacity limits, where 
both the number of objects and their precision affect capacity independently 
(e.g., Alvaraz & Cavanagh, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006). For example, based on 
the results that capacity for simple objects was much higher than capacity for 
complex objects, Alvarez and Cavanagh (2004) concluded that capacity is 
limited by an upper bound in the number of objects that can be stored but that 
within that upper bound capacity can be flexibly allocated depending on item 
complexity. 
Although the results of the current study are in agreement with recent 
studies, we should be careful with making any strong claims based on this 
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study. One problem in the current study was the nature of the stimuli used in the 
change detection task. The different dimensions of the stimuli were interrelated, 
meaning that a change on one dimension would also change another dimension. 
For example, when the shape of an object changed, the spatial distribution of 
colored and white squares also changed. Moreover, it has been shown that 
changing the spatial location of colors (as when the spatial distribution changed 
in current study) can severely impact change detection performance (e.g., 
Olivers & Schreij, 2014), even when the location information is task irrelevant 
(Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Kondo & Saiki, 2012; Treisman & Zhang, 2006). 
This could explain some of the findings in our additional analyses that looked at 
the amount of detail memorized and the type of change that occurred. When 
participants memorized shape and color we saw an improvement on color 
change detection and a decline when the pattern changed compared to the 
memorize shape only condition. We speculate that the difference on the color 
change is explained by the increased relevancy of the color change detection in 
the memorize shape and color condition compared to the shape only condition. 
The decline of performance on the pattern change can be explained by an 
increase in uncertainty on whether a color change has occurred. When the 
pattern changed so did the location of the colored squares, when participants are 
instructed to indicate whether the color has changed, the change in a colors’ 
location can cause uncertainty and with that more errors (cf., Jiang et al., 2000; 
Kondo & Saiki, 2012; Treisman & Zhang, 2006). More importantly, the 
proposed increased uncertainty on test could explain the main effect in the 
current study in the same way as the increase in detail can. Increased 
uncertainty on test and not the increase in detail during encoding could have 
been responsible for the decline in working memory performance. It is possible 
that the irrelevant feature changes on test and the uncertainty it brings is what 
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drives our main effect instead of an increase in memorized detail. How 
irrelevant feature changes can affect change detection performance is an 
interesting line for future research. Currently, studies that have examined this 
have found mixed results. For example, Woodman, Vogel, and Luck (2012) 
found no evidence that change detection performance was affected by irrelevant 
size or location changes. Others have shown that although irrelevant features 
can be encoded automatically in a change detection task, this only affected 
change detection performance when relevant memory load was low (Xu, 2010), 
or when the retention interval was short (<500 ms, Logie, Brockmole, & Jaswal, 
2010). 
Lastly, it could be argued that we did not really manipulate the amount 
of detail participants had to memorize per object (or the precision), but instead 
manipulated the amount of visual features that had to be memorized per object. 
While precision and the number of visual features memorized per object are 
closely related, as in the amount of visual features can affect the precision with 
which objects are memorized (e.g., Fougnie, Asplund, and Marois, 2010), they 
are not the same. How the number of visual features affect working memory 
capacity will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
The current study sought to address the question to what degree we can 
control the level of detail with which we can memorize visual stimuli and if 
precision can be traded in for more capacity to memorize additional objects. 
This question was addressed using a change detection task in which one or more 
visual stimuli had to be memorized. Participants were instructed to memorize 
these stimuli at one of three possible levels of detail. Estimates of working 
memory capacity indicated that memorizing stimuli at higher levels of detail 
resulted in a reduction of the number of items which could be memorized. 
VISUAL WORKING MEMORY VARIES WITH INCREASED ENCODING DETAIL    61 
These results are compatible with information-limited models of working 
memory, which state that the total amount of information that has to be 
memorized is the limiting factor in working memory, regardless of how this 
information is distributed across individual objects. One novel finding in the 
current study is that the trade-off between level of detail and number of objects 
is to a certain degree under voluntary control.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
BILATERAL BUT NOT LATERALIZED POSTERIOR SLOW 
WAVE ACTIVITY REFLECTS FEATURE LOAD IN VISUAL 
WORKING MEMORY 
1 
A major ongoing debate in visual working memory research concerns the 
question whether visual working memory capacity is determined only by the 
number of objects that have to be memorized, or by the number of relevant 
features contained within these memorized objects. Here, we examine the effect of 
feature load on visual working memory capacity, change detection sensitivity, and 
posterior slow wave event-related brain potential (ERP) activity during memory 
retention using a change detection task with multi-feature objects. Working 
memory capacity and sensitivity decreased significantly as a function of both the 
number of objects and the number of features memorized per object. 
Contralateral Delay Activity (CDA) was strongly sensitive to the number of 
objects, but not to the number of features. Additional analyses of both ipsilateral 
and contralateral brain activity, however, revealed a pattern that also reflected 
feature processing. We conclude that objects as well as features contribute to 
limitations in visual working memory capacity and that bilateral and lateralized 
slow wave activity might reflect two separate systems that underlie feature and 
object processing 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Quak, M., Langford, Z.D., London, R.E., & Talsma, D. (under revision). Bilateral but 
not lateralized posterior slow wave activity reflects feature load in visual working 
memory 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans are equipped with the ability to maintain information in an 
active state beyond the immediate sensory experience. This cognitive ability – 
commonly referred to as ‘working memory’ – allows us to maintain various types 
of information (e.g., verbal, visual) and is a key factor across many daily 
activities. For example, in the absence of visual working memory, imagine how 
tremendously effortful it would be to ride a bicycle in busy traffic. Indeed, we are 
constantly processing incoming visual information, selecting and holding on to 
relevant parts of the stream, and integrating them into a coherent visual scene 
according to our current goals. A major ongoing issue in the domain of visual 
working memory concerns the question of how we encode, maintain and recall 
visual information: Do we store individual features of an item in memory, fully 
integrated items, or a combination of both? In other words: Is it possible to define 
what Fougnie, Asplund, and Marois (2010) refer to as a “unit” of working 
memory that we can use to describe in which form information is stored? 
 The literature is currently divided as to whether information is 
maintained as integrated objects, or whether the individual features of objects are 
stored independently. One way to address this issue is to measure visual working 
memory capacity. A task that is often used for measuring capacity is the change-
detection paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are rapidly presented with an 
array of items that needs to be memorized, followed by a short retention interval. 
After the retention interval participants are presented with a test array, which can 
either be identical to the memory array, or differ from it on one specific feature of 
a single item (for example, in an array of colored squares, one of the squares may 
have changed color). On each trial, participants report whether a change has 
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occurred between the memory and test array, and the accuracy on this task can be 
used to estimate capacity. 
Using this task, several studies have reported that visual working memory 
capacity is determined solely by the number of objects that have to be memorized 
(object load), regardless of the number of features that constitute these objects 
(feature load; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Vogel, Woodman, & 
Luck, 2001; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). For example, Luck & Vogel (1997) 
provided evidence that memory for objects with up to four relevant features was 
as good as memory for objects with only a single relevant feature. The fact that 
the number of features to be memorized did not seem to influence visual working 
memory capacity suggested that objects, but not features, are the units of visual 
working memory. In contrast, several other studies (Olson & Jiang, 2002; 
Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002) did find effects of features on working 
memory capacity when features were from the same feature dimension, and 
others (Fougnie et al., 2010; Hardman & Cowan, 2015; Oberauer & 
Eichenberger, 2013; Palmer, Boston, & Moore, 2015; Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015; 
Wilson, Adamo, Barense, & Ferber, 2012) observed similar effects of features 
across feature dimensions. This would suggest that objects are not stored in 
working memory in a completely integrated manner. For example, Oberauer & 
Eichenberger (2013) used novel multi-feature objects, and found that change 
detection accuracy decreased from one to three features remembered per object 
and decreased even further from three to six features. The question whether 
information is maintained as integrated objects, or whether the individual features 
of objects are stored independently has therefore not been resolved on the basis of 
these studies. 
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An important advance in the study of visual working memory was the 
discovery of a lateralized event-related potential (ERP) component, known as the 
Contralateral Delay Activity (CDA). Klaver, Talsma, Wijers, Heinze, and Mulder 
(1999) found a clear contralateral slow-wave ERP during memorization of one 
polygon during the memorization and retention interval of a change detection 
task. Vogel and Machizawa (2004) have expanded on this finding by showing 
that CDA negativity increased linearly with an increase in object-load until an 
individual’s capacity limit is reached. Since then, the CDA has been used to 
examine the limitations of visual working memory (see for a review: Luria, 
Balaban, Awh & Vogel, 2016). Thus far, only a couple of studies have examined 
the impact of memorizing individual features on CDA negativity, and similarly to 
behavioral studies, with varying results. One study by Woodman and Vogel 
(2008) found no change in CDA amplitude for feature load. By contrast, Luria 
and Vogel (2010) found an increase in CDA amplitude for feature load, but only 
in the initial part of the CDA (between 450-600 ms post stimulus presentation) 
and only when the to-be-remembered features were from the same feature 
dimension. Wilson et al. (2012) found an increase in CDA negativity for 
conjunction stimuli compared to single feature stimuli in a situation where the to-
be-remembered features were from different feature dimensions.  
This discrepancy in the literature regarding the influence of feature load 
on VWM capacity that is apparent both in purely behavioral as well as 
psychophysiological studies could possibly be explained by a crucial difference 
in the low-level stimulus features that were employed in each study. Authors 
reporting effects of objects, but not of features, typically only used stimuli 
consisting of feature combinations that are difficult to process independently of 
each other (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Vogel et al., 2001; 
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Woodman & Vogel, 2008). For example, Luck & Vogel (1997) used relatively 
simple objects, consisting of bars of different colors and shapes. Processing the 
orientation of such a colored bar is contingent upon the shape of that bar, thus 
promoting automatic feature binding. Because the different features occupy the 
same spatial area, a form of obligatory binding can occur, minimizing the effects 
of feature load. Such automatic binding could be avoided by using more complex 
stimuli, in which multiple features can be more or less independently manipulated 
and processed. Indeed, studies employing this stimulus type have typically 
reported an effect of feature load. These studies, however, did typically not 
manipulate the object load (Fougnie et al., 2010; Oberauer & Eichenberger, 2013; 
Palmer et al., 2015).  
 In order to fully understand the dynamics between feature and object 
processing, the independent manipulation of both object-load and feature-load 
would be required. For example, Hardman & Cowan (2015) found that both the 
number of objects and the number of features determine working memory 
capacity. It should be pointed out, however, that the type of stimuli that Hardman 
and Cowan (2015) used, might lead to an underestimation of the effect of feature 
load because features occupied the same spatial location. Oberauer and 
Eichenberger’s (2013), stimuli might be better suited for the independent 
manipulation of features and objects, because they comprise multiple features 
with their own spatial boundary within an object, allowing for a better separation 
of single features. 
The goal of the current study was to determine in which form visual 
information is stored in working memory. We used a novel approach to 
investigate whether the capacity of working memory depends on object load 
and/or feature load. In addition, we investigated the neural correlates of object 
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and feature processing by using the above-mentioned CDA ERP component 
(Klaver et al., 1999; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). We used a set of stimuli based 
on those of Oberhauer and Eichenberger (2013) which allowed us to manipulate 
object and feature load independently (see Figure 1). All objects were colored 
rectangles with differing heights and widths, and surrounded by black borders. 
Inside the rectangular objects, three black lines were drawn that could change in 
thickness and orientation. In the two experiments presented here we used a 
change detection task (see Figure 1). First, a memory array with a varying 
number of multi-feature objects was presented (In Experiment 2, the memory 
array was preceded by a cue that indicated which of the two hemifields needed to 
be remembered) followed by a short retention interval. After the retention 
interval, a test item was presented on the location of one of the objects from the 
memory array and participants indicated whether the object had changed on one 
of the relevant features. Participants were informed at the beginning of each block 
what the relevant feature(s) were, and that a change could only occur for those 
feature(s). We specifically sought to measure working memory performance as a 
function of the number of objects and the features per object that had to be 
remembered by calculating sensitivity (d`) and capacity (Cowan’s K) measures. 
D-prime is an often-used measure of sensitivity that is independent of personal 
response biases towards change or no-change answers in a change detection task. 
Cowan’s K is a measure that estimates a participant’s visual working memory 
capacity. 
In experiment 2, we focused on the neural correlates of the interaction 
between feature and object load, by investigating the CDA component. We 
examined both object load and feature load and their respective effects on CDA 
negativity in posterior brain areas. We expected that feature load would affect 
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visual working memory capacity for objects (Cowan’s K) and that both objects 
and features would affect change detection sensitivity (d`). For Experiment 2 we 
expected that the increase in memory load by both objects and features would be 
reflected in CDA negativity. To foreshadow, our results show that working 
memory capacity is influenced by both object load and feature load, and that 
objects are therefore not stored in a completely integrated manner. 
METHOD EXPERIMENT I 
Participants 
Twelve undergraduate students (mean age 18 years, 11 female) 
participated in Experiment 1, in exchange for course credit. All participants gave 
informed consent and reported having normal color vision and normal or 
corrected-to-normal eyesight. One participant was excluded from further analyses 
because of performance levels that were below chance level.  
Material 
The experiment was programmed in OpenSesame using the PsychoPy 
back-end (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012; Peirce, 2007). All memory arrays 
used in the change detection task (see below) consisted of one to four rectangular 
objects, and were based on the stimuli used by Oberauer and Eichenberger 
(2013). Objects were presented on a gray background in an 11.56° by 7.68° area 
surrounding fixation. Objects were randomly assigned to a location in one of the 
four quadrants of the larger area. All objects were colored rectangles with a thin 
black outline and (three) thick black lines inside the rectangle (see Figure 1). 
Objects could vary along four different feature dimensions: shape, color, the 
thickness of the black lines within each object, and the orientation of the black 
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lines within each object. Height and width were randomly determined per object, 
but all objects had the same surface area, on average 2.64° by 2.64° in visual 
angle. For every trial objects were randomly composed from the feature options 
available. Table 1 gives an overview of the dimensions of the features used and 
the change that could occur between sample and test array. 
 
Table 1 Feature dimensions used in Experiment 1 and 2, with the possible feature 
values of each object and the amount of change that could occur on a change 
trial 
Feature 
dimensions 
Possible feature values Feature change 
Shape width 
(in pixels) 
70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140 +40 or -40 pixels 
Color 
(in hexadecimal) 
Red (#FF0000), Orange 
(#FF6A00), Yellow (#FFD800), 
Light green (#B6FF00), Green 
(#4CFF00), Cyan (#00FFFF), 
Light blue (#0094FF), Blue 
(#0026FF), Violet (#B200FF), 
Magenta (#E100DC), Pink 
(#E1006E) 
+4 or -4 steps in 
color 
Line orientation 
(in degrees) 
11, 29, 47, 65, 83, 101, 119, 137 +72 or -72 degrees 
in Experiment 1, 
+18 or -18 in 
Experiment 2 
Line thickness 
(in pixels) 
7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32, 37, 42 +20 or -20 pixels 
Note. Shape height was determined by dividing 10000 by the width 
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Figure 1. Example change-detection trial sequence of Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. Each trial started with an initial fixation period (with location cue 
in Experiment 2) for 500 ms followed by random fixation period of 400, 500, or 
600 ms. A memory array with one or multiple multi-feature objects presented for 
200 ms preceded a blank retention interval for 900ms. The test array containing 
one of the multi-feature items from the memory array was shown until response. 
Participants indicated whether a change had occurred on the relevant feature 
dimension(s). 
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Procedure 
Participants were seated behind a personal computer approximately 60 
centimeters in front of the monitor. The task started with general instructions 
explaining the change detection task. Before each block participants were 
instructed what the relevant feature(s) for that block would be (shape, color, 
orientation, thickness, shape and color, orientation and thickness, or all) and 
received eight practice trials before each block. Each trial started with a fixation 
dot in the middle of the screen for 900, 1000, or 1100 ms, randomly selected on 
each trial. Then the memory array was presented for 200 ms followed by a 900 
ms retention interval in which no stimuli were presented. After the retention 
interval the response display was presented until participants made their response 
(see Figure 1A for an overview of the trial sequence in Experiment 1). Responses 
were made on a keyboard by pressing either the ‘z’ or ‘m’ key to report a change 
or no-change, respectively. The stimulus response mapping switched halfway 
through the experiment and was counterbalanced between participants. After 
response a red or white fixation dot was shown for 120 ms to indicate incorrect or 
correct answers respectively. 
The three different experimental conditions (single-feature, two-features, 
and four-features) were administered in separate blocks in a random order for 
each participant. There were a total of seven different experimental blocks: Four 
single-feature blocks, where one of the four features was the relevant feature: 
color, shape, thickness, or orientation; two two-feature blocks, where two of the 
features were relevant: color and shape or thickness and orientation; and one 
four-feature block, where all four features were relevant. In the single-, and two-
feature-change conditions only the relevant (to-be-remembered) features could 
change in the test display. In the four-feature-change condition all features could 
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change and every feature change occurred the same number of times within a 
block. There were a total of 64 trials in every experimental condition (number of 
objects: one, two, three, and four; number of features: one, two, or four) of which 
half of the trials were change trials. 
Analyses 
To explore the interaction between object load and feature load we 
calculated d′ for each number of objects and features per participant. Hit and false 
alarm rates were used to calculate d′ values (cf. Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). 
Scores of 0 were replaced by 0.5/total and scores of 1 were replaced by (total-
0.5)/total where total is the total number of trials in that condition (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005).  
To investigate the overall impact of feature load on working memory 
capacity we calculated Cowan’s K. Cowan’s K was calculated by (proportion hits 
– proportion false alarms) * set size (Cowan, 2001) for each participant for each 
condition. Maximum K values were used as the capacity estimate per participant 
per feature condition. 
In cases where Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated degrees of freedom were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
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RESULTS EXPERIMENT I 
D-prime 
Average d′ values for all conditions are shown in Figure 2A. Differences 
in the d’ values were analyzed in a 3 (Feature load: 1, 2, or 3) x 4 (Object load: 1, 
2, 3, or 4) repeated measures ANOVA. A significant main effect of Object load 
was observed, F(3, 30) =108.141, p < .000, ηp² = .915. D-prime decreased with 
increasing memory load from 1 to 4 objects. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
change detection accuracy decreased significantly when more objects needed to 
be remembered from 1 to 2 objects ( p < .000), from 2 to 3 objects (p < .001), and 
from 3 to 4 objects (p = .003). There was also a significant main effect of Feature 
load, F(2, 20) = 13.016, p <.000, ηp² = .566. D-prime decreased from 1 to 2 
features remembered (p= .006), and 1 to 4 features (p =.007) but not from 2 to 4 
features (p=1). Not only object load but also feature load had a significant impact 
on VWM capacity. The interaction between Object load and Feature load was not 
significant. A 3 (Feature Load) x 4 (Object load) repeated measures ANOVA on 
β showed no significant main effect on Object load, (p = .136) or Feature load (p 
= .625), and no significant interaction between the two (p = .573). This indicates 
that participants did not adopt a different response pattern across the different 
conditions. 
Cowan’s K 
Estimated capacity (K) values per feature load are shown in Figure 2B. A 
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on Feature load (1, 2, or 4) shows that K 
decreased significantly when more than one feature needed to be memorized, F(2, 
20) = 19.979, p <.001, ηp² =.666. Pairwise comparisons reveal that K did not 
decrease further between the 2 and 4 feature conditions.  
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To be sure that the effect of Feature load was not due to the different 
feature dimensions used in the experiment, we also calculated K for Feature load 
and the feature dimension that was relevant (see Figure 2C). A 3 (Feature load: 1, 
2, or 4) x 4 (Feature dimension: shape, color, orientation, or thickness) repeated-
measures ANOVA on maximum K showed a significant effect of Feature load, 
F(2, 20) = 17.921, p <.001, ηp² =.642. K decreased when more features were 
required to be memorized. K did not decrease beyond 2 features. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed a significant difference between 1 and 2 features (p =.001), 
and 1 and 4 features (p =.006), but not between 2 and 4 features (p =.330). There 
was a significant main effect for Feature dimension, F(3, 30) = 8.249, p <.001, ηp² 
=.452. Contrast analyses revealed that K was significantly higher for color 
compared to orientation (p =.002), and significantly lower for orientation 
compared to color (p =.002), and thickness (p =.014). No significant difference 
was observed between shape and color (p =.239), shape and thickness (p =1), 
shape and orientation (p =.708), and color and thickness (p =.587). There was no 
significant interaction between Feature load and Feature dimension. Capacity was 
affected equally for all features by the number of features that needed to be 
remembered. 
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Figure 2. Behavioral results as represented by d-prime and Cowan’s K of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The results for Experiment 1: (A) the effect of 
feature load (1, 2 or 4 features) on average d-prime per object load (1, 2, 3, or 4); 
(B) the effect of feature load on Cowan’s K; (C) The effect of feature load on 
Cowan’s K per feature dimension (shape, color, line orientation, and line 
thickness).The results for Experiment2: (D) the effect of feature load (1 or 4 
features) on average d-prime per object load (1 or 3); (E) the effect of feature load 
on Cowan’s K; (F) The effect of feature load on Cowan’s K per feature 
dimension. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT I 
 In Experiment 1 we sought to investigate how object load and 
feature load affect visual working memory capacity. We measured change 
detection performance while varying object load and feature load independently. 
We calculated d` to measure change detection sensitivity and Cowan’s K to look 
at the impact of feature load on visual working memory capacity. 
Change detection performance, as measured by Cowan’s K and d`, 
dropped significantly when more objects had to be memorized. Crucially, change 
detection performance was also affected by feature load, supporting the idea that 
the basic unit of visual working memory cannot be defined by objects alone, and 
that features indeed play a role as well. Feature load had a significant impact on 
visual working memory capacity as defined by Cowan’s K. This effect was not 
due to differences in memorization difficulty of the different feature dimensions: 
Even though we observed differences in capacity for the different feature 
dimensions (with the biggest difference between color and orientation), 
increasing the number of features that had to be memorized affected capacity 
equally across all feature dimensions. These results are consistent with earlier 
findings that indicate that feature load affects the number of objects we can 
successfully store in working memory (Fougnie, et al., 2010; Hardman & Cowan, 
2014; Oberauer & Eichenberger, 2013; Palmer, et al., 2015; Vergrauwe & 
Cowan, 2015). While both the number of objects and the number of features 
affected change detection, they did not interact. It seems that object load and 
feature load influence memory independently. 
Interestingly, our estimates of Cowan’s K and d` did not decrease beyond 
a feature load of two. This might be due to the relatively small feature load in the 
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current experiment. Indeed, Oberhauer and Eichenberger (2013) did find a further 
decrease in change detection performance beyond a feature load of two. In their 
study, participants had to memorize either one, three or six features per object. 
Alternatively, the lack of an effect of feature load beyond memorizing two 
features might suggest that after an initial cost, memorizing more features does 
not affect working memory further. This is in line with a notion by Alvarez & 
Cavanagh (2004), who suggested that when memorizing an object, a core set of 
features is automatically included in the memory trace. Memory performance will 
then only be affected when features outside of this core set need to be memorized. 
In the current study one or multiple features could have been part of the core 
feature set and thus overestimate the actual number of features memorized in the 
four-feature condition. Similarly, it could be argued that the specific features used 
in this experiment allow for a separation of an object in two parts, a colored 
square and an oriented line stimulus, and that the found cost of features is because 
participants memorized more parts (or objects) instead of more features. 
However, this seems unlikely because it would assume that adding a relevant 
feature of the same part (e.g., adding color when memorizing shape) would not 
show a decrease in performance, which is not what visual inspection of the data 
(Figure 2c) suggests. 
Our results support the idea that the basic unit of visual working memory 
is defined both by objects as well as features (e.g., Fougnie et al., 2010; Hardman 
& Cowan, 2014) and the effect of feature load cannot be accounted for by a pure 
object based view (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Vogel et al., 
2001; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). We believe the contradictory findings in the 
literature may be caused by differences in the type of multi-feature objects used 
in those studies. Some types of object might encourage binding due to the 
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different feature dimensions within one object occupying the same spatial area, 
whereas other objects might make binding difficult due to the different features 
being from separate dimensions as well as at separate spatial locations. While the 
type of objects used in the experiments can explain some of the contradictions in 
the literature we do not think it is the only cause of these contradictions. For 
example, it fails to explain the contradictory results of Luck and Vogel (1997) 
and Hardman and Cowan (2014) who used exactly the same materials and 
methods in their respective studies.  
It can still be argued that the effect of features in current and previous 
studies (Fougnie, et al., 2010; Hardman & Cowan, 2014; Oberauer & 
Eichenberger, 2013; Vergrauwe & Cowan, 2015) is due to a process other than 
memorization of the stimuli. For example, the number of features might affect 
performance during retrieval or response (Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Busch & 
Herrmann, 2003). To examine the effect of feature load during memorization we 
recorded simultaneous EEG in Experiment 2.We were specifically interested in 
the effect of feature load on activity over posterior brain areas reflected by the 
CDA waveform. We expected that CDA negativity would increase with object 
load as well as feature load. Also, we expected that feature load would affect 
visual working memory capacity for objects (Cowan’s K) and that both object 
load and feature load would affect change detection sensitivity (d`). 
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METHOD EXPERIMENT II 
Participants 
Sixteen undergraduate students (mean age 27 years, 10 female, all right 
handed) participated in Experiment 2, in exchange for payment. All participants 
gave informed consent and reported having normal color vision and normal, or 
corrected-to-normal eyesight. Two participants were excluded from further 
analyses because over 50% of epochs were removed after artifact rejection. 
Material 
With the exception of the following parameters the same material was 
used as in Experiment 1. All memory arrays consisted of one or three rectangular 
objects presented in each hemifield. All objects were presented on a gray 
background in a 15° by 15° area. There were four possible locations in each 
hemifield surrounding fixation. Locations of objects were randomly selected on 
each trial from the available options. Objects used were identical to the objects 
used in Experiment 1. For every trial, objects were randomly created from the 
options available. Table 1 gives an overview of the dimensions of the used 
features and the change that could occur between sample and test array. 
Procedure 
With the exception of the following parameters the same procedure was 
used as in Experiment 1. Participants were seated behind a personal computer 
with their chin in a chinrest 60 centimeters in front of the monitor. The general 
trial sequence was the same as Experiment 1 except that the first fixation screen 
was replaced with a cue (the word left or right presented above and below a 
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fixation dot; see Figure 1B for an overview of the trial sequence in Experiment 
2).  
The two different conditions (single-feature and four-features) were 
administered in separate blocks in a random order for each participant. There 
were a total of five different experimental blocks: Four single-feature blocks, 
where one of the four features was the relevant feature: color, shape, thickness, or 
orientation; and one four-feature block, where all four features were relevant. In 
the single-feature change conditions only the relevant (to-be-remembered) 
features could change in the test display. In the four-feature-change condition all 
features could change and every feature change occurred the same number of 
times within a block. There were a total of 320 trials in every experiment 
condition (number of objects: one or three; number of features: one or four) of 
which half of the trials were change trials. 
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing 
EEG data were collected using a Biosemi ActiveTwo system (Biosemi, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands) with 64 Ag–AgCl scalp electrodes positioned 
according to the standard international 10–20 system. Additional electrodes were 
attached to the left and right mastoids to be used as a reference. Electrodes at the 
outer canthi of both eyes and directly above and below the right eye were used for 
acquiring a horizontal and vertical electrooculogram (EOG). Signals were 
recorded with a sampling rate of 512 Hz. During preprocessing, a band-pass filter 
with a high-pass cutoff of 0.01 and a low-pass cutoff of 30 Hz was applied after 
which data was resampled to 256 Hz. Data was re-referenced offline to the 
average of the left and right mastoid. Eye blinks were corrected using 
independent component analysis (ICA). Bad channels were interpolated by 
calculating the average activity of surrounding electrodes. The data were epoched 
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from −200 ms to 1100 ms, time-locked to the onset of the memory array. Simple 
voltage threshold (larger than 75 μV) automatic artifact rejection together with 
visual inspection was used to remove trials with extreme values. 
EEG Analysis 
For each condition separately, average waveforms were calculated over 
trials and participants. Contralateral waveforms were generated by averaging 
activation on left stimulus presentation and right hemisphere electrodes and 
activation on right stimulus presentation and left hemisphere electrodes. 
Ipsilateral waveforms were generated by averaging activation on left stimulus 
presentation and left hemisphere electrodes and right presentation on right 
hemisphere electrodes. CDA difference waves were calculated by subtracting 
ipsilateral activation from contralateral activation. CDA amplitude was calculated 
by averaging the mean amplitude in the range of 200 to 1100 ms post stimulus-
presentation. Trials containing artifacts or incorrect behavioral responses were 
excluded from the averaging procedure. On average 15% of total trials (range 
2.7% – 38.7%) were removed per participant. The number of removed trials were 
evenly distributed across conditions.  
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RESULTS EXPERIMENT II 
D-prime 
D` values where calculated using the same method as used in Experiment 
1. Average d′ values for all conditions are shown in Figure 2D. A 2 (Object load: 
1, or 3) x 2 (Feature load: 1, or 4) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a 
significant main effect of Object load, F(1, 13) = 240.093 , p < .001, ηp² = .949. 
When participants memorized more objects their change-detection performance 
decreased compared to when they memorized a single object. A significant main 
effect of Feature load, F(1, 13) = 17.241, p = .001, ηp² = .570, indicated that 
memorizing more features per object significantly decreased change-detection 
performance. The interaction between objects and features was not significant. A 
2 (Feature load: 1, or 4) x 2 (Object load: 1, 3) repeated measures ANOVA on β 
showed a significant main effect of Object load, F(1, 13) = 30.895, p < .001, ηp² 
= .704. β was significantly higher for 1 object compared to 3 objects. We 
observed no significant main effect of Feature load (p = .201). There was a 
significant interaction between Object load and Feature load, F(1, 13) = 4.734, p 
= .049, ηp² = .267. The difference between 1 and 4 features memorized per object 
was bigger when participants memorized 1 object compared to 3 objects. 
Cowan’s K 
Estimated capacity (K) values were calculated for each condition and 
participant (see Figure 2E). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (Feature 
load: 1, or 4) showed a significant effect of Feature load, F(1, 13) = 13.610, p 
=.003, ηp² =.511. Capacity decreased when more features needed to be 
memorized per object. We also calculated maximum K for Feature load and the 
feature dimension that was relevant (see Figure 2F). A 2 (Feature load: 1, or 4) x 
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4 (Feature dimension: shape, color, orientation, or thickness) repeated-measures 
ANOVA on maximum K showed a significant main effect of number of Feature 
load, F(1,13) = 14.351, p =.002, ηp² =.525. There was furthermore a significant 
main effect of Feature dimension, F(3, 39) = 84.811, p <.001, ηp² =.867. Capacity 
was affected by the type of feature that needed to be remembered. Capacity for 
color was significantly higher compared to shape (p =.001), orientation (p <.001), 
and thickness (p =.001). Capacity for orientation was significantly lower 
compared to color (p <.001), shape (p <.001), and or thickness (p <.001). There 
was no difference in capacity between shape and thickness. The interaction 
between Feature load and Feature dimension was not significant, F(3, 39) = 
2.567, p =.068, ηp² =.165. 
Electrophysiology 
Contralateral and Ipsilateral wave forms averaged across electrode sites 
P7 and P8, PO3 and PO4, and PO7 and PO8 are shown in Figure 3A. Average 
amplitude of the CDA waveform and the CDA difference wave are shown in 
Figure 3B. A 2 (Object load: 1, or 3) x 2 (Feature load: 1, or 4) repeated measures 
ANOVA on CDA mean amplitude revealed a significant main effect of Object 
load, F(1, 13) = 28.367, p < .001, ηp² = .686. The CDA amplitude was 
significantly more negative when participants memorized 3 objects compared to 
when they memorized 1 object. All other main and interaction effects were not 
significant (p’s > .385). Surprisingly, despite the clear effects of Feature load in 
behavior, we did not find any effect of Feature load on CDA amplitude. Because 
of this discrepancy we conducted the following additional analysis. 
 A 2 (Object load: 1, 2) x 2 (Feature load: 1, 4) x 2 (Lateralization: 
contralateral, ipsilateral) repeated measures ANOVA on mean amplitude showed 
the expected significant main effect of Lateralization, F(1, 13) = 18.575, p = .001, 
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ηp² = .588. Mean amplitude was more negative contralateral than ipsilateral. 
More interesting is that we found a significant main effect of Feature load, F(1, 
13) = 7.032, p = .020, ηp² = .351. Mean amplitude was more negative when 
memorizing one feature per object compared to four features per object. 
Coincidentally, we found no significant main effect of Object load, F(1, 13) = 
3.549, p = .082, ηp² = .214. Mean amplitude was the same when memorizing 1 or 
3 objects. However, the interaction between Object load and Lateralization was 
significant, F(1, 13) = 28.370, p < .001, ηp² = .686. Amplitude negativity 
increased significantly between 1 and 3 objects but only contralateral and not 
ipsilateral. Moreover, the interaction between Feature load and Lateralization was 
not significant, F(1, 13) < 1, p = .443, ηp² = .044. Other main and interaction 
effects not mentioned were not significant (p’s > .235). To confirm the 
topographical distribution of contralateral and ipsilateral activation, average 
ipsilateral and contralateral amplitudes across the scalp for each condition are 
plotted in Figure 3C. 
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Figure 3. ERP results for Experiment 2. (A) Grand average wave forms of mean 
amplitude in microvolt (μV) over time (ms) for ipsilateral and contralateral 
activity averaged across electrode sites P7 and P8, PO3 and PO4, and PO7 and 
PO8. Solid lines represent object load 1 and dotted lines object load 3, black lines 
represent feature load 1 and blue lines feature load 4. (B) CDA mean amplitude 
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between 200 and 1100 ms post stimulus presentation per condition and the CDA 
difference wave averaged over electrode sites P7 and P8, PO3 and PO4, PO7 and 
PO8. (C) scalp topographies show mean amplitude ipsilateral and contralateral 
between 200 and 1100 ms for all conditions. 
DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT II 
In Experiment 2 we sought to investigate the neural activity related to 
feature and object processing in visual working memory. To do so, we used a 
change-detection task similar to that employed in Experiment 1, but now using a 
lateralized presentation of the stimuli and using two levels of stimulus load and 
feature load. The main finding of this experiment was that the CDA component 
was strongly sensitive to object load, but not to feature load. However, additional 
analyses of both ipsilateral and contralateral brain activity revealed a more 
intricate pattern of results that also reflected feature processing, showing that 
feature load does have an impact on brain activity during VWM maintenance.  
At a behavioral level, change detection performance dropped 
significantly as a function of both feature and object load. Both capacity estimates 
(Cowan’s K) and sensitivity (d-prime) decreased with increasing feature and 
object loads. As was the case in Experiment 1 we found no evidence for an 
interaction between object and feature load. These findings are consistent with 
other studies that showed effects of feature load on working memory performance 
(Hardman & Cowan, 2014; Oberauer & Eichenberger, 2013; Palmer, et al., 2015; 
Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015). 
As mentioned above, CDA amplitude is largely unaffected by feature 
load. This result is consistent with findings by Woodman and Vogel (2008) who 
also found no change in CDA amplitude for feature load. In contrast to the 
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current study however, Woodman and Vogel (2008) did not find an effect of 
feature load in their behavioral data. While the difference in behavioral results 
between the current study and that of Woodman and Vogel (2008) could be 
explained by the difference in multi-feature objects used across these 
experiments, it is more difficult to explain the CDA results in these terms. To the 
best of our knowledge the current study is the first to show this discrepancy 
between the behavioral effects and CDA amplitude. The implications of this 
discrepancy will be discussed below.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study we aimed to examine the effect of feature and object load on 
visual working memory capacity. Specifically we sought to examine the interplay 
between these two factors, both at the behavioral as well as at the 
electrophysiological level. Participants memorized arrays of one, or multiple, 
multi-feature objects and had to report whether one of the objects had changed 
after a short retention interval. Objects could change on a pre-indicated relevant 
feature. In the two experiments we conducted, we found that visual working 
memory capacity was significantly impacted by feature- as well as object load, 
but found no interactions between these factors, suggesting that object and feature 
load modulated working memory capacity independently. In Experiment 2, CDA 
amplitude increased as a function of object load, but not of feature load. When we 
subsequently analyzed the ipsilateral and contralateral slow wave activity 
independently, we did find an effect of feature load: The mean ERP amplitude 
during retention was less negative when memorizing four features compared to 
memorizing one feature.  
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The current study replicates the basic finding that feature load can affect 
visual working memory capacity (Cowan, Blume, & Saults, 2013; Hardman & 
Cowan, 2014; Oberauer & Eichenberger, 2013; Olson & Jiang, 2002; Palmer, et 
al, 2015; Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002). 
More importantly, this is the first study that shows that the CDA component is 
only affected by object load despite a clear impact of feature load on behavioral 
performance. Instead, effects of feature load were reflected in a bilateral increase 
in negativity. These findings support the idea that the CDA component itself is 
only sensitive to object load (cf., Woodman & Vogel, 2008).  
When looking at contralateral and ipsilateral posterior slow-waves in the 
same electrodes used in the computation of the CDA we do find an effect of 
feature load. A higher feature load was represented by a more positive slow-wave 
compared to a lower feature load. Similar effects of feature load on posterior slow 
waves were found by Kursawe and Zimmer (2015). In their study participants 
memorized colored polygons, which could change in color, shape, or both. 
Because stimulus presentation was unilateral and not bilateral (which is required 
for the CDA) the authors looked at posterior slow-wave activity. They found a 
more positive going slow-wave for the shape-color conjunction condition 
compared to the shape only condition. It is interesting that, but as of yet 
unknown, why an increase in feature load results in a more positive wave-form, 
but an increase in object load generally results in a more negative wave-form. 
Future research is needed to answer this question. 
In the current study, the effect of feature load on posterior slow-wave 
amplitude seems to be an effect that occurs on both the ipsilateral and 
contralateral side. This might indicate that some form of feature processing is 
occurring on the ipsilateral side. We are not the first to show that some visual 
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processing might occur on the ipsilateral side in working memory. For example, 
Arend and Zimmer (2011) examined whether delay activity ipsilateral to the 
relevant items represents processing of relevant or irrelevant items. Activity 
contralateral to the relevant items increased in negativity with an increase of 
relevant item set-size. When the relevant set-size was 1 item, contralateral 
activity was more positive when there was 1 irrelevant item presented compared 
to 2 or 3 irrelevant items. Activity ipsilateral to the relevant items did not increase 
with an increase in relevant items. However, when the relevant set-size was 1, 
ipsilateral negativity increased as the number of irrelevant items increased from 1 
to 2, and from 2 to 3. These findings indicate that ipsilateral activity might reflect 
stimulus processing in some situations. Moreover, some researchers (e.g., 
McCollough, Machizawa, & Vogel, 2007) report a decrease in CDA amplitude 
due to an increase in ipsilateral negativity in the latter part of the retention 
interval. This increase ipsilateral negativity is thought to represent a later 
processing of relevant information in the ipsilateral hemisphere.  
While there is no apparent effect of object load on bilateral delay activity, 
there is an interaction between object load and lateralization. The difference in 
amplitude between memorizing one or three objects was much larger on the 
contralateral side compared to the ipsilateral side. The interaction between object 
load and lateralization and the lack of interaction between feature load and 
lateralization might explain why we find an effect in the CDA for object load but 
not feature load. CDA computation is based on a difference in amplitude between 
contralateral and ipsilateral sides. As is the case in the current study, the effect of 
object load on delay activity is often bigger on the contralateral side compared to 
the ipsilateral side. When computing the CDA these lateralized differences will 
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become more apparent while bilateral effects, the effect of feature load in current 
study, will be abated.  
The discrepancy between the CDA results, and both the bilateral ERP 
results and behavioral findings indicates that at least two independent 
mechanisms are contributing to the retention of information in visual working 
memory: a lateralized object-based mechanism and a bilateral feature-based 
mechanism. A similar conclusion was drawn by Xu and Chun (2006) who found 
two separate systems in visual working memory in an extensive functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. They found that activity in the 
inferior intraparietal sulcus was limited by a fixed number of objects at different 
spatial locations, whereas activity in the superior intraparietal sulcus and lateral 
occipital complex was related to stimulus complexity and the overall amount of 
visual information that was encoded.  
In line with the results of Xu and Chun (2006), Fougnie et al. (2010) 
suggested a model that can explain how objects and features contribute 
independently to the limitations of visual working memory. This model predicts 
that the number of objects affects the precision of memory and the general 
storage capacity, whereas the number features only affects memory precision. 
When object load increases, the probability that objects are encoded in working 
memory and the precision with which they are encoded decreases. Increasing 
feature load will only affect the precision of information that is represented in the 
encoded objects. 
The notion that multiple mechanisms are involved in retaining 
information in working memory is compatible with studies showing that effects 
of feature load can occur under specific circumstances. Wheeler and Treisman 
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(2002) suggested a framework in which different feature types are memorized in 
their own domain-specific stores. An additional store can maintain the binding of 
these features, when the task requires it. This framework may thus explain why 
object load and not feature load influences working memory performance in a 
typical change-detection task. The multi-feature objects typically used in these 
studies consist of features from distinct dimensions (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel 
et al., 2001; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). According to Wheeler and Treisman 
(2002), these features can be retained in their own specific store and therefore do 
not affect working memory performance. Several studies (Olson & Jiang, 2002; 
Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Xu, 2002) indeed support this idea by showing that 
feature load does affect working memory capacity, but only when those features 
are from the same feature dimension (e.g., color-color conjunctions). When 
features are from different feature dimensions (e.g., shape and color, or color and 
orientation) object memory is typically not affected. It is important to note, that 
the idea that effects of feature load are only found when the memorized features 
share a single dimension seems to be at odds with our results and those of the 
aforementioned studies that also show effects of feature load across dimensions 
(Fougnie, e al., 2010; Cowan, et al., 2013; Hardman & Cowan, 2014; Oberauer & 
Eichenberger, 2013; Palmer, et al., 2015; Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015).  
It appears that visual working memory is more flexible than a whole-
object account would suggest. Two recent studies have found that task 
instructions can change the strategy with which participants memorize visual 
information (Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015; Fougnie, Cormica, Kanabar, & Alvarez, 
2016). Using a novel reaction time task Vergauwe and Cowan (2015) show that 
objects and features can both be used depending on the task requirements. When 
binding between features was not encouraged, retrieving feature information was 
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more difficult, but when feature binding was encouraged retrieving object 
information was more difficult. This suggests that the unit of working memory is 
not fixed and can be flexibly adapted to task requirements. 
Taken together, the results of the current study indicate that both objects 
and features contribute to limitations in visual working memory capacity. The 
discrepancy between lateralized EEG activity that is sensitive to the number of 
objects memorized and the bilateral EEG activity that is more sensitive to the 
number of features memorized per object, suggests that two separate systems 
might underlie the processing of object and feature information in visual working 
memory retention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98     CHAPTER 3 
REFERENCES 
Alvarez, G. A., & Cavanagh, P. (2004). The capacity of visual short-term 
memory is set both by visual information load and by number of objects. 
Psychological science, 15(2), 106-111.  
Arend, A. M., & Zimmer, H. D. (2011). What does ipsilateral delay activity 
reflect? Inferences from slow potentials in a lateralized visual working 
memory task. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 23(12), 4048-4056.  
Awh, E., Barton, B., & Vogel, E. K. (2007). Visual working memory represents a 
fixed number of items regardless of complexity. Psychological science, 
18(7), 622-628.  
Busch, N. A., & Herrmann, C. S. (2003). Object-load and feature-load modulate 
EEG in a short-term memory task. Neuroreport, 14(13), 1721-1724.  
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A 
reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 24(1), 87–114. 
Cowan, N., Blume, C. L., & Saults, J. S. (2013). Attention to attributes and 
objects in working memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(3), 731. 
Fougnie, D., Asplund, C. L., & Marois, R. (2010). What are the units of storage 
in visual working memory? Journal of vision, 10(12), 27-27.  
Fougnie, D., Cormiea, S. M., Kanabar, A., & Alvarez, G. A. (2016). Strategic 
Trade-Offs Between Quantity and Quality in Working Memory. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Mar 
7, 2016, No Pagination Specified.  
Hardman, K. O., & Cowan, N. (2015). Remembering complex objects in visual 
working memory: Do capacity limits restrict objects or features? Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(2), 
325.  
Klaver, P., Talsma, D., Wijers, A. A., Heinze, H. J., & Mulder, G. (1999). An 
event‐related brain potential correlate of visual short‐term memory. 
NeuroReport, 10(10), 2001-2005. 
Kursawe, M. A., & Zimmer, H. D. (2015). Costs of storing colour and complex 
shape in visual working memory: Insights from pupil size and slow 
waves. Acta psychologica, 158, 67-77.  
FEATURE LOAD IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY     99 
Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for 
features and conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279-281.  
Luria, R., & Vogel, E. K. (2011). Shape and color conjunction stimuli are 
represented as bound objects in visual working memory. 
Neuropsychologia,49(6), 1632-1639.  
Luria, R., Balaban, H., Awh, E., & Vogel, E. K. (2016). The contralateral delay 
activity as a neural measure of visual working memory. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 62, 100-108.  
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user’s guide 
(2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Mathôt, S., Schreij, D., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). OpenSesame: An open-source, 
graphical experiment builder for the social sciences. Behavior Research 
Methods, 44(2), 314-324.  
McCollough, A. W., Machizawa, M. G., & Vogel, E. K. (2007). 
Electrophysiological measures of maintaining representations in visual 
working memory. Cortex, 43(1), 77-94.  
Oberauer, K., & Eichenberger, S. (2013). Visual working memory declines when 
more features must be remembered for each object. Memory & 
Cognition, 41(8), 1212-1227. doi: 10.3758/s13421-013-0333-6 
Olson, I. R., & Jiang, Y. (2002). Is visual short-term memory object based? 
Rejection of the “strong-object” hypothesis. Perception & psychophysics, 
64(7), 1055-1067. doi: 10.3758/BF03194756 
Palmer, J., Boston, B., & Moore, C. M. (2015). Limited capacity for memory 
tasks with multiple features within a single object. Attention, Perception, 
& Psychophysics, 77(5), 1488-1499. doi: 10.3758/s13414-015-0909-2 
Peirce, J. W. (2007). PsychoPy - Psychophysics software in Python. Journal of 
Neuroscience Methods, 162(1), 8-13. 
Stanislaw, H., & Todorov, N. (1999). Calculation of signal detection theory 
measures. Behavior research methods, instruments, & computers, 31(1), 
137-149. doi: 10.3758/BF03207704 
Vergauwe, E., & Cowan, N. (2015). Attending to items in working memory: 
evidence that refreshing and memory search are closely related. 
Psychonomic bulletin & review, 22(4), 1001-1006. doi: 10.3758/s13423-
014-0755-6  
 100     CHAPTER 3 
Vogel, E. K., & Machizawa, M. G. (2004). Neural activity predicts individual 
differences in visual working memory capacity. Nature, 428(6984), 748-
751. doi: 10.1038/nature02447 
Vogel, E. K., Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (2001). Storage of features, 
conjunctions, and objects in visual working memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(1), 
92. doi: 10.1037//0096-1523.27.1.92 
Wheeler, M. E., & Treisman, A. M. (2002). Binding in short-term visual memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131(1), 48. doi: 
10.1037//0096-3445.131.1.48 
Wilson, K. E., Adamo, M., Barense, M. D., & Ferber, S. (2012). To bind or not to 
bind: Addressing the question of object representation in visual short-
term memory. Journal of vision, 12(8), 14-14. doi: 10.1167/12.8.14 
Woodman, G. F., & Vogel, E. K. (2008). Selective storage and maintenance of an 
object’s features in visual working memory. Psychonomic bulletin & 
review, 15(1), 223-229. doi: 10.3758/PBR.15.1.223 
Xu, Y. (2002). Limitations of object-based feature encoding in visual short-term 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 28(2), 458. doi: 10.1037//0096-1523.28.2.458  
Xu, Y., & Chun, M. M. (2006). Dissociable neural mechanisms supporting visual 
short-term memory for objects. Nature, 440(7080), 91-95. doi: 
10.1038/nature04262 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
WORKING MEMORY SCAFFOLDING: DOES AUDITORY 
CONTEXT FACILITATE WORKING MEMORY 
MAINTENANCE. INTEGRATION OF SENSES, SPACE AND 
ORDER IN WORKING MEMORY 
1 
An ongoing question in working memory research is how serial order 
information is encoded, represented, and retrieved. A dominant feature of 
models explaining serial order processing is that to-be-remembered items 
are bound to specific position markers. One idea is that these position 
markers are spatial in nature based on experiments that show a clear 
relationship between serial order memory and spatial processing on a 
horizontal axis. In the current experiment we examine whether an auditory 
context can influence the spatial processing and subsequent recall of serially 
presented visual items in working memory. Using a cross-modal Sternberg 
task we found that spatial processing of nonverbal items only occurred when 
items in a sequence were presented together with a specific auditory context 
that was both predictable and informative. Spatial processing did not 
improve visual item recall. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1Quak, M., Abrahamse, E., van Dijck, J.P., & Talsma, D. (in preperation). Working 
memory scaffolding: Does auditory context facilitate working memory maintenance. 
Integration of senses, space and order in working memory 
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INTRODUCTION 
Memorizing serial order is one of the key functions of working 
memory. When asked to memorize a telephone number it is not only 
important to recall the actual numbers but also the order in which they have 
to be dialed. How serial order is encoded, represented, and maintained in 
working memory is still an ongoing question, which spawned multiple 
models (see for a review: Marshuetz, 2005). One idea is that serial order is 
maintained by placing the numbers on an internal spatial template in 
working memory (Abrahamse, van Dijck, & Fias, 2016; Abrahamse, van 
Dijck, Majerus, & Fias, 2014). In the current study we wished to examine 
whether a cross-modal context could influence the internal spatial processing 
of items in memory and if this would facilitate serial order working memory. 
 One of the ways with which serial order item memory has been 
investigated is by using the Sternberg task (Sternberg, 1966). In this task, 
participants are instructed to maintain a series of items that are sequentially 
presented in the middle of the screen. After a retention period, a target item 
is presented, and the task is to determine as fast and accurate as possible 
whether this item belonged to the presented memory sequence or not. 
Responses are given on one of two predefined response buttons. This 
paradigm was originally conceived as a method to investigate scanning in 
verbal working memory. It is based on the assumption that if response 
selection requires information maintained in working memory, response 
delays can inform us on the underlying processes when retrieving this 
information.  
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In the original study, participants were also instructed to memorize 
the order in which the items were presented and after the initial target 
response they were asked to reproduce this order. Since the inclusion of the 
order instruction and task had no effect on the initial item verification task, it 
was later dropped from the procedure (see for a review, Sternberg, 1976). 
The task is now considered to investigate how item information (and not 
order) is retrieved from working memory (Majerus et al., 2006, 2010). Since 
Sternberg performance is independent from the instruction to encode order 
information (e.g., Sternberg, 1975), this might suggest that order information 
is automatically encoded. Indeed, Guida, Leroux, Lavielle‐Guida, & Noël 
(2015) observed spontaneous serial order coding in a Sternberg task without 
the explicit instruction to memorize serial order. Therefore the Sternberg 
task is ideally suited to explore spontaneous serial order representations. 
One of the dominant features of models explaining serial order 
maintenance is that of position marking (see for a review: Hurlstone, Hitch, 
& Baddeley, 2013). It suggests that to-be-remembered items are bound to 
specific long-term memory markers and that serial order recall is achieved 
by retrieving these bindings. Little is known about the cognitive nature of 
position markers. In a recent proposal, Abrahamse, et al. (2014) assume that 
the position markers used to memorize serial order items are grounded in an 
internal and spatial coordinate system. Specifically, items are assumed to be 
bound to specific coordinates of an internal space (cf. working memory; see 
for reviews: Abrahamse et al., 2014, 2016). Spatial attention is used to 
search through the serial order representation in working memory and select 
items for retrieval. There is growing evidence for this proposal. 
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For example, using a modified Sternberg task van Dijck and Fias 
(2011) found that retrieving items presented early in a sequence elicited 
faster left handed responses whereas items presented later in a sequence 
elicited faster right handed responses. Participants were presented with 
sequences of 5 items (numbers, or fruits and vegetables) with a self-paced 
presentation time. During the retention interval, all possible items were 
presented twice in random order and participants were asked to do a 
categorization task (by parity, odd or even, for numbers, and by category, 
fruits or vegetables, for words) but only in response to items that were 
presented in the sequence. Results showed that left-handed responses were 
faster when reacting to items early in the sequence and right-handed 
responses were faster for items later in the sequence, independent of the type 
of information that was maintained. They conclude that items in a sequence 
are placed on a mental spatial template based on their ordinal position in the 
sequence. More specifically, this implies that items early in the sequence are 
bound to left space while items later on in the sequence are bound to right 
space.  
Follow up studies have shown that the spatial effect was not limited 
to a response bias but could also interact with attention. Using a Posner 
cueing paradigm, van Dijck, and colleagues (2013, 2014) showed that 
serially presented numbers or letters that were maintained in memory would 
shift attention from left to right based on the items’ ordinal position. 
Moreover, retrieval of items early and late in a sequence can be facilitated by 
directing attention to the left or right side of space respectively (de Belder, 
Abrahamse, Kerckhof, Fias, & van Dijck, 2015). Rinaldi, Brugger, 
Bockisch, Bertolini, & Girelli (2015) found more evidence that visuospatial 
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attention is used at serial recall. They found that retrieval of items in 
working memory affected spontaneous eye movements in function of the 
ordinal position of items in the sequence. Taken together, these studies show 
a clear relationship between serial order working memory and spatial 
processing on a horizontal axis in support of the view that position markers 
are spatial in nature. 
It is assumed that the spatial default context of this spatial coordinate 
system is horizontal, from left to right. However, this spatial system is highly 
flexible and can seemingly encode items in different spatial configurations. 
Different spatial biases have been found dependent on the type of items, or 
the context with which these items had to be memorized; top to bottom 
(Dutta & Nairne, 1993), right to left (Guida, Abrahamse, & van Dijck, in 
prep), numeral pad (Darling, Allen, Havelka, Campbell, & Rattray, 2012), or 
the face of a clock (Bächtold, Baumüller, & Brugger, 1998; Ristic, Weight, 
& Kingstone, 2006). For example, when instructed to imagine the 
memorized number(s) on the face of a clock, participants gave faster right-
handed responses to numbers on the right side of the clock (number 1 to 5) 
and faster left-handed responses to numbers on the left side of the clock 
(number 7 to 11; Bächtold et al., 1998; Ristic et al., 2006). Similarly, in a 
process called visuospatial bootstrapping, Darling et al. (2012, 2016) found 
that serial number recall accuracy was improved when the locations of 
presented numbers matched the spatial location of a typical, numeral pad (as 
found on a telephone or remote control). These studies show that the spatial 
configuration with which serial presented items are represented are 
contextually driven. 
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 The aim of the current study was to examine whether an 
irrelevant auditory context could influence the spatial context with which 
serially presented visual items are represented in working memory and 
whether this would facilitate subsequent item recall. Visual and auditory 
information can interact in working memory more so than previously 
assumed (see for a review: Quak, London, & Talsma, 2015). Studies 
examining multisensory working memory in the audiovisual domain have 
shown that: a) recall is better for cross-modal objects compared to modality 
specific objects (Goolkasian and Foos, 2005; Delogu, Raffone, & 
Belardinelli, 2009; Thompson and Paivio, 1994); b) capacity can be higher 
for cross-modal objects (Fougnie and Marois, 2011; Saults and Cowan, 
2007), and c) that visual and auditory information can interfere with each 
other (Goolkasian and Foos, 2005; Morey and Cowan, 2004, 2005). More 
importantly, associations between pitch and vertical locations have been 
shown to help integrate visual and auditory information for better more 
effective processing (Cabrera & Morimoto, 2007; Chen & Spence, 2011; 
Roffler & Buttler, 1968). For example, multiple studies have shown that the 
pitch of a sound can influence the speed with which locations of visual items 
are discriminated. Responding to items that were positioned high or low on 
screen were faster when accompanied by a high or low pitched sound 
respectively, compared to opposite bindings (e.g., Evans & Treisman, 2010, 
Patching & Quinlan, 2002). Also, responding to high and low tones was 
faster when participants had to respond with buttons placed high or low on a 
response pad (Lidji, Kolinsky, Lochy, & Morais, 2007; Rusconi, Kwan, 
Giordano, Umilta, & Butterworth, 2006). Similar to the results by van Dijck 
et al (2013), Chiou and Rich (2012) found that attentional shifts were 
induced by spatially non-lateralized and non-predictive sounds of different 
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pitches, and that this effect could be flexibly modulated by contextual factors 
like top-down control and frequency range. 
In the experiment presented here we used a 4-item Sternberg task 
with visually presented Chinese characters in the center of the screen. 
Participants were instructed to memorize the four Chinese characters in the 
sequence. After a short retention interval a memory probe was presented and 
participants indicated with a left or right handed response if the memory 
probe was part of the initial sequence or not. Left and Right handed 
responses were used to estimate a participants’ spatial bias. Spatial bias is an 
estimate of how items are represented in space in working memory. It 
assumes that faster left handed responses are made to items early in the 
presentation order (ordinal position 1 and 2) compared to later items (ordinal 
position 3 and 4) and faster right handed responses are made to items later in 
the presentation order (ordinal position 3 and 4) compared to early items 
(ordinal position 1 and 2).  
To examine whether an auditory context would influence the spatial 
coding of visual items we created three different auditory contexts: a 
monotone, an ascending, and a random auditory context. Each Chinese 
character in the sequence was simultaneously presented with one out of four 
auditory tones. The tone that was presented at a given point in the sequence 
was determined by the auditory context. In the monotone context one out of 
four tones was randomly selected and that same tone was presented with 
every Chinese character in the sequence. With the ascending condition the 
four tones were presented in ascending order (from low to high), one with 
each character presentation. In the random condition each of the four tones 
was randomly paired with one of the Chinese characters in the sequence. We 
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expected that the monotone context would show a regular left to right spatial 
bias because the tones were the same on every presentation in a trial giving 
no extra information. In the ascending context we expected to observe an 
enhanced left to right spatial bias because the low to high ascending tone 
sequence elicits a stronger spatial identity in the visual sequence. We 
expected to observe an inhibited spatial bias in the random context because 
the random tones give no clear spatial identity to the visual items which 
could disrupt the spatial processing of the visual items. Lastly, we expected 
better and faster memory recall in context conditions that show a clear 
horizontal spatial bias compared to conditions that do not. 
METHOD 
Participants 
In total sixty undergraduate students (mean age 19 years: range 17-
23) participated in this study, in exchange for course credit. All participants 
gave informed consent. In total six participants were excluded from further 
analyses. Of these six, four were excluded based on below chance level 
performance on the initial familiarization task and two were excluded based 
on below chance level performance in the main task. 
Materials 
Visual and auditory stimuli were presented electronically on a 
personal computer using the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). For the visual stimuli, Chinese characters were 
selected from a larger stimulus set created by Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, 
Amy, and Szmalec (2002). In their study Chinese characters were rated on 
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similarity creating sixteen unique character families containing four visually 
similar characters each. In the current study we used 10 of these characters 
(Figure 1B), with each character selected from a different character family to 
keep overlap between different characters to a minimum. Each character was 
presented in black in the center of the screen against a white background, 
with a height and width of 3° by 3° in visual angle. On every trial four 
characters were randomly selected from the pool of ten characters to create a 
visual stimulus sequence. 
Four tones were created using Audacity® version 2.0.5. The pitches 
of the tones were A (440 Hz), B (493.88 Hz), C# (554.37 Hz), and D (587.33 
Hz). Duration for each tone was 200 ms, with rise and decay times of 50 ms 
at the start and end of this interval. These tones were used to create three 
types of auditory context: (a) a monotone tone sequence, where one of the 
four tones, randomly selected, was repeated on every visual presentation in a 
trial, (b) an ascending tone sequence, where the four tones were presented in 
ascending order, and (c) a random tone sequence, where tones where 
randomly positioned in the sequence. Tones where presented on a noise-
cancelling headphone (Sennheiser HD 215) to the participants at 65 dB. 
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Figure 1. Trial sequence and stimuli. (A) Each trial started with an initial 
fixation for 1000 ms followed by the presentation of a memory sequence 
consisting of four randomly selected visual characters presented for 250 ms 
with an ISI of 750 ms. An auditory tone was presented with each visual 
character. The memory sequence was followed by a 1000 ms retention 
interval followed by the memory probe. The memory probe was presented 
until a response was made. Participants reported whether the memory probe 
was part of the presented sequence or not. (B) All ten Chinese characters 
used in the experiment. 
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Procedure 
Participants were seated behind a desktop computer approximately 
60 centimeters in front of the monitor. The task started with general 
instructions explaining the experimental session. The experiment consisted 
of a familiarization phase, a working memory task, and a concluding 
questionnaire. 
For the familiarization task, participants were presented with 3 
blocks of 12 trials. In each block all ten Chinese characters were presented in 
random order for 1000 ms following a fixation cross in the middle of the 
screen. Twice during each block a fixation cross would be followed by a red 
dot in the middle of the screen. Participants were instructed to passively 
watch the Chinese characters and hit the space bar whenever a red dot 
appeared. Each familiarization block was followed by a self-paced break. 
 The memory task started with general instructions explaining 
the task. Participants were instructed to memorize a sequence of four 
Chinese characters on each trial. Each sequence was followed by a retention 
interval after which a memory probe was presented. Participants had to 
respond to the memory probe by indicating whether the presented item was 
part of the sequence in memory or not. If the memory probe occurred in the 
sequence the participant pressed the button corresponding to ‘old’, otherwise 
the button corresponding to ‘new’.  
Each trial started with an initial fixation for 1000 ms followed by the 
presentation of a memory sequence (see Figure 1A for an overview of the 
trial sequence). The memory sequence consisted of four randomly selected 
visual characters presented for 250 ms with an ISI of 750 ms. The onset of 
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each visually presented character in the sequence was synchronized with the 
simultaneous presentation of an auditory tone. The memory sequence was 
followed by a 1000 ms retention interval in which an “=” was presented in 
the center of the screen to distinguish it from the ISI and to alert the 
participant that the next item presented was the memory probe. The memory 
probe was presented until a response was made and could either be a ‘new’ 
item (not presented in the prior sequence) or an ‘old’ item (presented in the 
prior sequence). Responses were made on a keyboard by pressing either the 
‘z’ or ‘m’ key to report a ‘new’ or ‘old’ item, respectively. The stimulus 
response mapping switched halfway through the experiment and was 
counterbalanced between participants. After the response a red fixation dot 
or blank screen was shown for 250 ms to indicate incorrect or correct 
answers respectively. 
The task started with a practice block of 20 trials using each 
Character twice as a target stimulus (once as an old target and once as a new 
target). The practice block contained no auditory stimuli. After the first 
practice block participants were presented with 3 experimental blocks, one 
for each auditory context (monotone, ascending, and random). After the first 
three experimental blocks the response mapping switched, participants were 
instructed on the response change and received a second practice block of 20 
trials to get accustomed to the new response mapping. After the second 
practice block participants received again 3 experimental blocks, one for 
each auditory context condition. The order of the experimental blocks was 
counterbalanced between participants. Each block consisted of 40 trials of 
which half were ‘old’ targets and half were ‘new’ targets for a total of 240 
trials.  
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After the main task participants filled out a concluding 
questionnaire. The questionnaire contained pictures of all ten Chinese 
characters used in the main task and participants were asked to indicate 
whether they used a verbal label to memorize these characters. Participants 
could write down the label they used for each character.   
Analyses 
Median reaction times were used to calculate spatial bias because of 
the wide variation of reaction times between and within subjects. Spatial bias 
was calculated by subtracting the left handed response to items that were 
presented early in the sequence (ordinal position 1 and 2) from the right 
handed response to items presented early in the sequence. This gives a value 
that represents the difference between left and right-handed responses on 
items presented early in the sequence. The same difference value was 
calculated for responses to items late in the sequence (ordinal position 3 and 
4) by subtracting right-handed responses from left handed responses. After 
adding these two difference scores one gets an estimate of spatial bias, where 
a value of 0 means no spatial bias, or no difference between responses made 
by left or right hand in light of ordinal position. A positive value would 
indicate a left to right spatial bias, where participants made faster left handed 
responses to items early in the sequence and faster right handed responses to 
items late in the sequence. A negative value of spatial bias would indicate a 
right to left spatial bias, that participants made faster right handed responses 
to items early in the sequence and faster left handed responses to items late 
in the sequence. 
 114     CHAPTER 4 
 In cases where Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. 
RESULTS 
Spatial bias 
 The mean estimates of spatial bias are shown in Figure 2. A 
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA on Context (monotone, ascending, and 
random) revealed a significant effect of Context on spatial bias, F(2, 108) 
=4.888, p < .009, ηp² = .083. Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant 
difference between the monotone and ascending context (p < .024) and 
between the ascending and random context (p < .005). There was no reliable 
difference in spatial bias between the monotone and random context (p 
=.638). Single-sample t Tests were conducted to determine if average spatial 
bias in each of three auditory contexts was significantly different from zero 
(no spatial bias). The ascending context elicited a clear left-to-right spatial 
bias (M = 94.58, SD= 251, SEM = 34), t(54) = 2,800, p < .007. The spatial 
biases in both the monotone (M = -17, SD = 285, SEM = 38) and random (M 
= -38, SD = 260, SEM = 35) context were not significantly different from 
zero (p’s > .4). 
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Figure 2. The mean estimates of spatial bias per auditory context. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Median reaction times 
Average reaction times for Context and Position are shown in Figure 
3A. Differences in average median reaction times were analyzed in a 3 
(Context: monotone, ascending, and random) x 4 (Position: 1, 2, 3, or 4) 
repeated measures ANOVA. We observed a significant main effect for 
Position, F(3, 159) =18.315, p < .001, ηp² = .257. Median reaction times 
were significantly faster when the item at test was presented in the last 
sequence position compared to third position (p < .001), second position (p 
<.001), and first position (p <.001). There were no significant differences 
between test items presented on the first, second, or third position (p’s > 
.592). The main effect of Context showed a trend towards significance, F(2, 
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106) =3.025, p < .061, ηp² = .054. Visual inspection of the medians seem to 
indicate that reaction times tended to be faster in the random auditory 
context. There was no significant interaction between Context and Position, 
F(6, 318) =1.468, p < .189, ηp² = .027. 
Accuracy 
Differences in accuracy were analyzed in a 3 (Context: monotone, 
ascending, and random) x 4 (Position: 1, 2, 3, or 4) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Average accuracy for Context and Position are shown in Figure 
3B. A significant main effect of Position was observed, F(3, 162) =54.701, p 
< .001, ηp² = .503. Accuracy increased when the test item was presented later 
in the sequence. Pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy increased 
significantly when the item at test was presented later in the sequence from 
position 1 to 2 ( p < .316), from position 2 to 3 (p < .001), and from position 
3 to 4 (p = .001). The main effect of Context and the interaction between 
Context and Position were not significant (F’s < 1), meaning that auditory 
context had no effect on average recall accuracy.  
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Figure 3. Behavioral results. (A) The effect of ordinal position on reaction 
time per auditory context. (B) The effect of ordinal position on accuracy per 
auditory condition. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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DISCUSSION 
In the current experiment we wished to examine whether an 
irrelevant auditory context could affect spatial processing in serial order 
working memory and whether this facilitated Sternberg performance. We 
used median response times on a 4-item Sternberg task with visually 
presented Chinese characters to estimate spatial bias. There were three types 
of auditory context that could coincide with visual stimulus presentation: a 
monotone, ascending, or random context. We expected that the ascending 
auditory context would cause a more defined or enhanced left to right spatial 
bias compared to the monotone auditory context which served as a baseline. 
The random auditory context was expected to disrupt spatial coding of the 
serially presented items. We expected that a more defined left to right spatial 
bias would enhance memory performance on the Sternberg task. 
Complementary to previous findings of van Dijck and colleagues 
(2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) the current study shows a relation between serial 
order working memory and spatial processes. More specifically, we found a 
clear left to right spatial bias when items in the sequence were 
simultaneously presented with an ascending auditory context. When items 
were presented with a monotone or random tone sequence no spatial bias 
was observed. These findings suggest that the ascending tone sequence was 
unique in its ability to facilitate the spatial processing of items in working 
memory. As far as we are aware this is the first study that shows that 
nonverbal items can be spatially processed, based on the items’ ordinal 
position in a sequence (cf. van Dijck & Fias, 2011). Studies that found 
spatial processing of serial order items in memory thus far only used verbal 
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items: numbers, letters, and words (van Dijck et al., 2011, 2013, 2014, 
2015).  
While the ascending tone sequence elicited a spatial bias this did not 
give a performance benefit over the conditions that did not elicit a spatial 
bias. Both accuracy and reaction times were not affected any differently 
between the three conditions. We initially assumed that the spatial 
processing of items in a sequence would help create a stronger working 
memory representation but at the moment our results do not support this 
idea. A possible explanation for these findings is that spatial encoding is 
simply redundant and that retrieval of these specific items does not rely on 
spatial scanning in working memory but on other retrieval mechanisms. 
While we did not find a performance benefit of spatial encoding on item 
memory it could be that other aspects of working memory that were not 
specifically tested in the current task did benefit from spatial encoding. It is 
possible that serial order recall (Darling et al., 2012; Delogu, et al., 2009), 
free recall (Goolkasian and Foos, 2005; Thompson and Paivio, 1994), or the 
capacity (cf. Fougnie and Marois, 2011; Saults and Cowan, 2007) of these 
items improved. It would be worthwhile to examine these effects in the 
future. Knowing under what circumstances spatial encoding improves or 
disrupts working memory and examining what aspects of working memory 
are actually affected could bring new insights on the underlying structure. 
It is interesting that we only found evidence of spatial encoding in 
one of three conditions in the current experiment. In fact, the condition that 
served as our baseline for performance, the monotone auditory context, did 
not show any spatial bias. Since there was no condition without an auditory 
context in the current study we cannot make any claims on whether visual 
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items are automatically processed spatially the same way that verbal items 
are. We can think of two possible explanations for why only the ascending 
auditory condition showed evidence for spatial encoding. First, it is possible 
that the visual items used in the current study are not automatically encoded 
in space based on their ordinal position. In this case, the ascending auditory 
context gave a unique context that induced spatial processing in that 
condition. Second, it is also possible that the visual items used here are in 
fact automatically spatially processed but that both the monotone and 
random auditory context interfered with this form of processing. While we 
are unable to distinguish between these explanations based on the current 
experiment, we can speculate on why the ascending tone context induced 
spatial processing or did not interfere with it. 
The ascending auditory context was the only context in which the 
tone sequence was both predictable (the same tone sequence on every trial) 
and informative (each visual character in a sequence was presented with its 
own unique tone). The predictable and informative characteristics of the tone 
sequence might have facilitated the integration of visual, auditory, and 
spatial order information. Indeed, it has been shown that multisensory 
integration is affected by top-down processes such as learned associations 
(Fiebelkorn, Foxe, & Molholm, 2010), attention, and predictability (see 
Talsma, 2015; Talsma et al., 2010 for reviews). For example, Fiebelkorn et 
al. (2011) have shown that facilitation of an auditory stimulus in a visual-
target detection task only occurred when participants could accurately 
predict the co-occurrence of the auditory and visual stimulus. Likewise, in 
the current study spatial encoding might have been elicited only when 
participants could predict the tones that would occur on each ordinal 
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position, which was impossible in the random auditory context. Therefore, in 
the random sequence, the variability among the tones may be too 
unpredictable for them to be bound together into an audiovisual object, 
which may, in turn, diminish the effectiveness of the auditory stimuli for 
facilitating spatial coding in working memory. But predictability alone 
cannot fully account for the effects we found. The monotone condition was 
also predictable but did not elicit spatial coding. Although both predictable, 
the ascending and monotone context differed on how informative each tone 
was in the sequence. In the ascending tone sequence each tone was unique 
which made each event (the simultaneous presentation of tone and visual 
item) in the sequence distinctive. It is known that an items’ bottom-up 
distinctiveness plays an important part in visual attentional selection and 
subsequent processing (see for a review: Fecteau & Munoz, 2006). 
Similarly, it has been shown that item distinctiveness is a key factor in 
multisensory integration (see for a review: Spence & Driver, 2004). For 
example, research has shown that salient auditory stimuli automatically 
integrate with concurrently presented visual stimuli and orient attention to its 
physical location (Van der Burg, Olivers, Bronkhorst, & Theeuwes, 2008). 
This shows that audiovisual integration processes can facilitate spatial 
processing. Both item predictability and item distinctiveness have been 
shown to facilitate spatial orienting and multisensory integration, and can 
help explain why evidence for spatial encoding was only found in the 
ascending context condition. 
It should be mentioned that we cannot rule out that spatial 
processing took place on the basis of an absence of a left-to-right spatial 
bias. Although we did not observe the assumed default left-to-right spatial 
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processing, it is possible that the random and monotone context facilitated 
other spatial configurations, for example top to bottom ones. Most studies 
that showed a relation between auditory pitch and spatial processing found 
effects on a vertical axis (e.g., Evans & Treisman, 2010, Patching & 
Quinlan, 2002; Lidji, et al., 2007; Rusconi, et al., 2006; Chiou and Rich, 
2012). Indeed, the fact that behavioral performance as measured with 
reaction times and accuracy did not differ between conditions seems to 
imply that the characters were represented as equally strong across 
conditions. Follow-up research could test the presence of other spatial 
configurations based on different auditory contexts.  
We would like to acknowledge that in the ascending condition, the 
pitch of the auditory stimulus was confounded with ordinal position. Each 
ordinal position was always presented with the same unique pitch in 
ascending order, low pitches early and high pitches late. Lidji, et al. (2007) 
have shown that pitch can interact with spatial locations in a horizontal space 
under certain circumstances. It is therefore possible that the response bias 
found in the ascending context was elicited because the auditory tone was 
automatically retrieved when an item on test matched an item in the 
sequence, evoking faster left or right-handed responses based on the pitch. In 
this case that would create the exact same effect, faster left handed responses 
on low pitch items (early in the position) and faster right handed responses 
on high pitch items (late in the position). To partially rule out the possibility 
that pitch influenced performance by itself in the ascending condition we did 
an additional analyses on the random condition. The random condition 
allowed us to look at the effects of pitch separate from ordinal position. We 
calculated spatial bias in the random condition by using pitch instead of 
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ordinal position. This analysis showed that pitch in itself did not elicit a left-
to-right spatial bias (M = -20.85, SD= 375.09, SEM = 50.58), t(54) = -0.412, 
p = .682, further supporting our conclusion that the found spatial bias was 
based on the ordinal position in combination with the ascending auditory 
context. 
In conclusion, the current data shows that processes responsible for 
the spatial recoding of nonverbal items in serial order working memory can 
be influenced by an irrelevant auditory context. We found a spatial bias 
based on the ordinal position of an item presented in a sequence but only 
when items co-occurred with an ascending auditory tone sequence. This 
seems to indicate that the auditory context needed to facilitate this 
repositioning has to consist of informative and predictable auditory stimuli. 
Although spatial encoding took place when presented with an informative 
and predictable context this did not improve item memory performance. 
Under which circumstances spatial encoding does improve memory retrieval 
is an interesting question for future research. The current study adds to the 
growing literature that shows that information from different modalities as 
well as long-term representations can interact in working memory beyond 
what was previously assumed and underscores the importance of examining 
multisensory interactions in working memory. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
A MULTISENSORY PERSPECTIVE OF WORKING 
MEMORY 
1 
Although our sensory experience is mostly multisensory in nature, research 
on working memory representations has focused mainly on examining the 
senses in isolation. Results from the multisensory processing literature make 
it clear that the senses interact on a more intimate manner than previously 
assumed. These interactions raise questions regarding the manner in which 
multisensory information is maintained in working memory. We discuss the 
current status of research on multisensory processing and the implications 
of these findings on our theoretical understanding of working memory. To do 
so, we focus on reviewing working memory research conducted from a 
multisensory perspective, and discuss the relation between working memory, 
attention, and multisensory processing in the context of the predictive coding 
framework. We argue that a multisensory approach to the study of working 
memory is indispensable to achieve a realistic understanding of how 
working memory processes maintain and manipulate information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1Quak, M., London, R. E., & Talsma, D. (2015). A multisensory perspective of 
working memory. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 9, 197. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In everyday life we experience a continuous stream of information 
that we perceive through sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch. Even though 
this experience is mostly multisensory, that is, we receive information from 
multiple senses simultaneously, psychological research has primarily 
focused on studying our senses in isolation. While we are beginning to 
understand how our senses interact at various stages of processing (for an 
overview see, e.g., Beauchamp, 2005; Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 2006; 
Klemen & Chambers, 2011; Wallace, Meredith, & Stein, 1993; Stein & 
Stanford, 2008) it is still heavily debated whether the higher-order mental 
representations that are derived from these sensory inputs still contain 
modality- specific information or not. For instance, in working memory, 
research has focused on resolving whether information is memorized in the 
form of separate, modality or domain specific representations (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974; Schneider & Detweiler, 1987), or as integrated representations 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Cowan, 2001).  
Multisensory processing refers to the interaction of signals arriving 
nearly simultaneously from different sensory modalities. This implies that 
information from one modality can influence information processing in 
another modality. Information from different sensory modalities can also be 
combined into a single multisensory event, a process that is referred to as 
multisensory integration (Stein et al., 2010). In accordance with the 
suggestions of Stein et al. (2010) we will use the terms “modality-specific” 
or “cross-modal” when describing the properties of objects and “unisensory” 
or “multisensory” when referring to neural or behavioral processes 
associated with a single or multiple sensory modalities. 
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The aim of this paper is to discuss the current status of research on 
multisensory processing and the implications of these findings for our 
theoretical understanding of working memory. To do so, we will focus on 
reviewing working memory research conducted from a multisensory 
perspective. We will argue that a multisensory approach to the study of 
working memory is indispensable to achieve a realistic understanding of 
how working memory processes maintain and manipulate information. 
WORKING MEMORY AND THE MULTISENSORY BRAIN 
In their seminal work, Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) devised a model 
for the flow of information in human memory, which subsequently became 
known as the modal model. They suggested that environmental information 
is processed by various modality-specific sensory registers before it is 
combined into a single, modality-independent, or more formally amodal, 
percept and transferred into a short-term store. According to this view, the 
short-term store is an amodal, general-purpose mechanism. Atkinson and 
Shiffrin referred to this mechanism as “working memory”, as it was 
considered to be responsible for a variety of operations, such as the 
selection, manipulation, and rehearsal of the memorized items. 
A few years later, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed a multiple-
component model of working memory where information is assumed to be 
stored in two domain-specific subsystems (the phonological loop and the 
visuo-spatial sketchpad) that are directed by a general control mechanism 
(the central executive). The phonological loop is responsible for short-term 
maintenance of speech-based and acoustic items. The visuo-spatial 
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sketchpad maintains visually and/or spatially encoded items. In contrast to 
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) idea of a domain-independent (i.e. amodal) 
store , Baddeley and Hitch (1974) assume that information (e.g., verbal or 
spatial) is maintained in its corresponding domain-specific store. 
Over the years it has become clear that information from different 
domains showed more interaction in working memory than one would 
expect from a strongly domain-specific perspective (e.g., Jiang, Olson, & 
Chung, 2000; Logie et al., 2000; Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 
2000). An episodic buffer was added to Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) 
original working memory model to account for, amongst other things, the 
apparent interaction between phonological and visual processes (Baddeley, 
2000). The episodic buffer can be conceived as an amodal storage 
component, which was estimated to hold up to four chunks of information. 
Additionally, it was proposed to act as a link between all the other working 
memory components described above. For this revised model, Baddeley 
(2000) suggested that the episodic buffer integrates memory traces that may 
originate from different senses into a coherent perceptual scene.  
On the basis of several studies, Postle (2006) has proposed that the 
brain areas involved in sensory perception are also responsible for the short-
term storage of sensory information. For instance, functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies showed object-specific memorization 
effects for faces in the posterior fusiform gyrus (e.g., Druzgal & D’Esposito, 
2003; Ranganath, DeGutis, D’Esposito, 2004), an area considered to be vital 
for face recognition. Postle and D’Esposito (1999) found activity related to 
memorization of visual object location and depiction in ventral temporal and 
occipital visual brain areas. Similarly, event-related potential (ERP) 
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modulations can be seen in posterior and occipital recording sites during 
short-term memorization of visual objects contralateral to the to-be-
remembered objects (e.g., Klaver et al., 1999; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). 
Such findings (for an overview see, D’Esposito & Postle, 2014; Postle, 
2006) indicate that memorizing modality-specific sensory information 
involves the same brain areas as those involved in the initial sensory 
processing of that information. This idea is compatible with the classical 
view that integration of the senses would take place at a later stage of 
processing, after initial unisensory processing has taken place (see Talsma, 
in revision, for a discussion). Indeed, using neurophysiological methods with 
animals (e.g., Fuster, Bodner, & Kroger, 2000; Wallace, Meredith, & Stein, 
1993) and fMRI with humans (e.g., Beauchamp, Lee, Argall, & Martin, 
2004; Calvert, Campbell, & Brammer, 2000; Wright, Pelphrey, Allison, 
Mckeown, & McCarthy, 2003) several higher-order brain areas have been 
identified that seem to be dedicated to integrating information from multiple 
unisensory sources. Brain areas typically regarded as multisensory in the 
human brain can for example be found in the lateral occipital-temporal 
cortex, such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS; Beauchamp, 2005).  
An increasing number of studies now suggest, however, that 
multisensory processing can already take place in brain areas that were 
considered to be strictly unisensory (see for a review, Foxe & Schroeder, 
2005; Macaluso & Driver, 2005). For example, Giard and Peronnet (1999) 
found multisensory ERP effects as early as 40 ms post-stimulus over 
occipital scalp areas, suggesting that multisensory interactions take place 
much earlier than previously assumed. Using fMRI, Foxe et al. (2002) 
showed integration related effects of auditory and somatosensory stimuli 
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within a region of the auditory cortex previously thought to be unisensory. 
This brain area was more strongly activated by multisensory stimuli than 
what might be expected on the basis of a mere summation of either auditory 
or tactile stimulation alone. Likewise, Dione et al. (2010) found increased 
BOLD signal in the right primary somatosensory cortex during a delayed 
sensory-to-motor task for cross-modal visual-somatosensory stimuli 
compared to modality-specific stimuli. 
These findings also have implications for the memorization of 
multisensory information. If indeed, as Postle (2006) proposes, the brain 
areas responsible for perceptual processing are the same as those involved in 
memorization, and if multisensory effects can already be observed in the 
primary sensory cortices, then we would expect that cross-modal 
information is stored as a unified representation in working memory. We 
specifically aim to focus on the questions regarding how multisensory 
information is encoded in working memory and whether we memorize the 
individual unisensory representations separately and integrate them at a later 
stage, or whether they are memorized as part of an integrated, multimodal 
representation instead. 
FEATURE BINDING IN WORKING MEMORY 
To fully understand the importance of considering working memory 
from a multisensory perspective, it is necessary to discuss how information 
is organized within working memory. An important question here is whether 
each feature of an object is remembered separately or not (e.g., 
Diamantopoulou et al., 2011; Klaver et al., 1999; Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
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Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Luria & Vogel, 2011; Luria, et al., 2010; Olsson 
& Poom, 2005; Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005; Vogel, Woodman, 
& Luck, 2001). For example, Luck and Vogel (1997) used a change 
detection task to examine the capacity of working memory for visual objects. 
Participants were presented with an array of stimuli, which they had to 
remember during an interval without the stimuli being present. After this 
retention interval a second array was presented and participants responded 
by indicating whether any visual changes had occurred between the second 
and the first array. Varying the number of visual objects that need to be 
memorized allows estimating the capacity of visual working memory. Luck 
and Vogel (1997) found that capacity was limited to approximately four 
objects, regardless of the number of feature dimensions, or individual 
features that needed to be remembered per object. This led them to conclude 
that visual working memory has an object-based and not a feature-based 
organization. It is important to note that these findings have not been 
replicated (Hardman & Cowan, 2014; Oberauer & Eichenberger, 2013). At 
the very least this suggests that feature binding can, but does not always, 
occur automatically. 
Interestingly, research has shown that an asymmetry exists in 
binding the visual and spatial features of an object. Multiple studies have 
shown that processing the visual features of an object automatically bind this 
object to its spatial location (e.g., Jiang, Olson, & Chung, 2000; Olson & 
Marshuetz, 2005). However, processing an object’s spatial location does not 
result in the automatic binding of that object’s visual features (Jiang, Olson, 
& Chung, 2000). While these findings show that binding of multiple features 
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can occur within the visuo-spatial domain, other studies have shown that 
binding of features can even occur across domains. 
Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, and Gabrieli (2000) showed that 
participants memorized verbal and spatial information in an integrated 
fashion. Participants in this study performed faster and more accurate on a 
verbal-spatial delayed-match-to-sample task when the probe was a letter-
location combination that was presented together in the sample array 
compared to a letter-location combination that was presented separately. The 
findings on binding of verbal and spatial information have been replicated 
and extended in multiple studies (Bao, Li, & Zhang, 2007; Campo et al., 
2008, 2010; Elsley & Parmentier, 2009; Guérard, Morey, Lagacé, & 
Tremblay, 2012; Meier, Nair, Meyerand, Birn, & Prabhakaran, 2014). For 
example, Bao, Li, and Zhang (2007) found that switching attention between 
verbal and spatial features was faster when they were features from one 
object than when they were features from separate objects. Additionally, 
Guérard et al. (2012) showed that phonological similarity of verbal material 
can carry over to the recall of spatial locations in a combined verbal-spatial 
serial recall task. Participants were sequentially presented with letters in 
specific locations and were asked to either recall the order of spatial 
locations shown or the order of letters shown. They found that the harmful 
effect of phonological similarity on verbal recall carried over to spatial 
recall, but that the harmful effect of spatial complexity on spatial recall did 
not carry over to verbal recall. While the question remains under which exact 
circumstances automatic binding or integration of cross-domain information 
occurs, the asymmetry found in visual feature and location binding as well as 
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verbal and spatial binding, suggest that the automatic integration of 
information across domains can occur.  
MULTISENSORY WORKING MEMORY REPRESENTATIONS 
Despite the evidence for integration of information from different 
domains, surprisingly little research has examined how multisensory 
information is represented in working memory. One of the first studies to use 
cross-modal stimuli was done by Thompson and Paivio (1994). Participants 
memorized three different types of items: visual, auditory, or audiovisual for 
a later free-recall test. Thompson and Paivio found an improvement of free 
recall of cross-modal audiovisual stimuli compared to modality-specific, 
audio or visual stimuli. This superior audiovisual performance was not 
simply due to the double presentation of information in audiovisual 
conditions (audio and visual dual presentation), because picture-picture and 
sound-sound dual presentation conditions did not yield a similar 
improvement. When pictures in the picture-picture dual presentation 
condition were two different exemplars of the same item a slight 
improvement in free recall was found but audiovisual performance still 
resulted in higher recall rates. Goolkasian and Foos (2005) also found that 
recall rates were higher for picture/spoken word and written/spoken word 
dual presentation conditions compared to the double visual presentation of 
pictures and written words. These findings suggest that the improved 
memory performance is due to the combination of information from 
different modalities and not because of the redundancy of the information 
itself.  
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In the multisensory literature, additive effects, such as for example 
linear increases of brain activity for multisensory stimuli (For an overview 
see; Calvert, 2001), are considered to be exemplary of multisensory 
processing. By contrast, in working memory research, similar additive 
effects, such as an increase in capacity for audiovisual material compared to 
modality-specific material, are considered evidence for the independence of 
the two modalities. For example, the advantage of cross-modal object recall, 
in the study of Thompson and Paivio (1994) was explained by Paivio’s “dual 
coding” theory (1971, 1986). This theory states that a memory trace for a 
cross-modal stimulus is a combination of the independent sensory traces that 
were encoded, which in turn can be recalled separately when the task so 
requires. While information from different modalities can interact to provide 
certain behavioral benefits, this information is in fact independent.  
Originally, the dual coding theory was developed to explain the 
independent, simultaneous processing of verbal and non-verbal information, 
but has later also been used to explain the independent, simultaneous 
processing of auditory and visual information. It is important to note that 
these forms of information can interact. Verbal information can be both 
visual (e.g., written words) and/or auditory (e.g., spoken words), and 
nonverbal information can also be visual (e.g., complex visual scenes) and/or 
auditory (e.g., white noise). We can make a distinction between the format 
of a working memory representation, i.e. the sensory modality in which the 
information is perceived and/or processed (e.g., auditory – visual), and the 
content of the representation, i.e. the actual information that is transferred 
(verbal - nonverbal). For example, when memorizing an array of blue 
squares or a picture of a cat, it might be more efficient to memorize this 
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verbally as the verbal code “blue squares” or “red cat”. However, when the 
task requires one to describe the exact spatial location of each square, or 
point out a specific cat in an array of red cat pictures, it would be more 
efficient to use a visual code. We assume that information is processed in the 
format code that is most optimal for the current task. This implies that 
multiple format codes might be used for one and the same object, if that is 
more effective for memorizing that object. 
Delogu, Raffone, and Belardinelli (2009) investigated how verbal 
and non-verbal auditory, visual, and audiovisual material is encoded in 
working memory. Participants were tested on immediate serial recall for 
sequentially presented visual, auditory, or audiovisual stimuli in either a 
non-verbal or verbal condition. In the non-verbal condition, stimuli were 
either pictures, environmental sounds, or a combination of both, and in the 
verbal condition, stimuli were either written words, spoken words, or a 
combination of both. Results showed that in the non-verbal condition serial 
recall for audiovisual stimuli was higher than recall for auditory or visual 
stimuli. In the verbal condition, recall for audiovisual material was still 
higher than recall for visual material, but auditory and audiovisual recall did 
not differ. The authors also found that preventing participants from 
articulating reduced memory performance in both the verbal and non-verbal 
conditions. This suggests that both in the verbal and in the non-verbal 
presentation conditions, the actual content of the representation was encoded 
in a verbal code. Furthermore, the verbal content seemed to play a key part 
in memorizing the stimuli in all conditions. This shows that the format in 
which information is presented is not necessarily the format in which the 
information is encoded. For example, when a participant is presented with an 
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auditory stimulus of a meowing cat, it is possible that this sound calls forth a 
picture of a cat, or the word ‘cat’, which is then kept in working memory 
instead of the auditory features of the original meowing sound that was 
presented. It is a requirement that the participant recognizes the presented 
sound as the meowing produced by a cat in order to ‘recode’ the sound into a 
visual or verbal representation. This requires semantic information from long 
term memory to be integrated with the working memory representation. 
Delogu et al. (2009) concluded that their findings are compatible with 
Baddeley’s working memory model (2000) where the existence of an 
episodic buffer integrates information from different modalities and 
combines this with semantic information from long term memory. Other 
studies have also shown the influence of semantic information from long 
term memory on visual working memory object representations (e.g., 
Diamantopoulou, et al., 2011; Olsson & Poom, 2005) suggesting that 
information outside the pure visual domain can affect early visual object 
working memory. Similarly, Darling, Allen, Havelka, Campbell, and Rattray 
(2012) found that accuracy on a digit serial recall task improved when the 
locations of presented digits matched the spatial configuration of a typical, 
numeral keypad (as found on a telephone or television remote) in a process 
they call visuospatial bootstrapping. They confirmed that this effect was due 
to the integration of the typical keypad representation from long-term 
memory with the working memory representation and not only to the 
binding between verbal and spatial information.  
Thus far, the main goal of the studies discussed above was to 
provide insights into the dual code theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986) and/or the 
multiple component theory (Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) 
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mainly by looking at recall performance for a wide variety of stimuli. To 
better understand how multisensory information interacts in working 
memory we can look at working memory capacity for cross-modal objects. 
As mentioned before, estimates of working memory capacity for features 
and objects have been used to infer that visual working memory 
representations are object based (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Likewise, by 
assuming that not only features within a modality but also across modalities 
are integrated into object representations, examining the number of cross-
modal objects one can hold in memory compared to modality-specific 
objects could give insight into the organization of multisensory working 
memory. For instance, Saults and Cowan (2007) found that working-
memory capacity for audiovisual material can exceed working-memory 
capacity for modality-specific material under certain conditions. In a series 
of five experiments, participants were presented with visual arrays of four to 
eight colored squares and auditory arrays of four spoken digits. They were 
instructed to memorize the visual array, the auditory array, or both. 
Interestingly, the performance advantage for audiovisual arrays disappeared 
when masks were used to block access to previously formed sensory 
memory traces. In this case, capacity for cross-modal stimuli was as high as 
the capacity of the highest modality-specific object, indicating that memory 
traces from an accessory sensory memory (echoic and/ or iconic memory) 
contributed to the improvement of task performance. Since auditory and 
visual information did not additively contribute to memory performance 
when sensory memory traces were excluded, Saults and Cowan (2007) 
concluded that auditory and visual information share a common storage. 
Fougnie and Marois (2011) contested this interpretation by arguing that the 
formula used by Saults and Cowan (2007) to estimate the maximum number 
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of object representations one can hold in working memory, might not 
adequately reflect the combined capacity of modality-specific stores. 
Fougnie and Marois argued that one item of auditory information generally 
places a larger load on memory than one item of visual information, 
suggesting that these modality-specific differences should be weighted 
accordingly in such a capacity estimate. Using an adapted formula in a series 
of three experiments, they found that even when using masks to exclude 
contributions of sensory memory traces, capacity for cross-modal items was 
superior to the capacity for modality-specific items. Contrary to Saults and 
Cowan (2007), they concluded that auditory and visual objects were stored 
in their own respective stores and contributed to performance without 
interfering.  
Overall, there seems to be a performance benefit for the 
memorization of audiovisual stimuli compared to the memorization of 
modality-specific stimuli. It remains under debate, however, whether this 
benefit exists because these stimuli are integrated into a new amodal 
representation or because the independent storage of auditory and visual 
information contributes to performance in an additive fashion because they 
do not interfere. At this time the same effect is used to argue for both sides 
of the debate. Where some see the additive performance of audiovisual 
objects as proof for an interaction or even integration of information in 
working memory (e.g., Delogu, et al., 2009), others see it as proof that 
sensory information is memorized in its own separate store (e.g., Fougnie & 
Marois, 2011).  
In addition to examining performance benefits for the combination 
of auditory and visual processing, we can also study the disruption of 
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processing for the combination of auditory and visual information. In 
traditional working memory research, interference paradigms have been used 
to show a double dissociation between two separate processing mechanisms. 
Meaning that when two processes use the same underlying system, 
interference will occur which impairs performance on both processes. The 
disruption of performance between modalities is referred to as cross-modal 
interference and would suggest that information from the different 
modalities interact at a certain level. For multisensory working memory this 
could mean that information from different modalities is maintained in a 
single, multisensory store. Evidence for cross-modal interference is still 
somewhat ambiguous, however. For instance, using a visual-pattern-recall 
and auditory-digit-recall dual task, Cocchini et al. (2002) did not find 
evidence for cross-modal interference on performance accuracy in working 
memory. The absence of such interference suggests that working memory 
operates in a domain-specific manner and is in accordance with the notion of 
parallel processing without interaction of information from different 
modalities. In contrast, Goolkasian and Foos (2005) showed that spoken 
words could interfere with the recall of pictures and written words when 
using long sequences of incongruent dually presented items. Likewise, 
Morey and Cowan (2004, 2005), did find cross-modal interference on 
performance accuracy when memory load was sufficiently high. They 
examined digit span using a verbal-visual dual task and found that 
participants showed interference for visual memory recall but only when the 
verbal load was sufficiently high (a load of 7 digits instead of 2). The 
interference patterns observed in audio-visual dual tasks are as of yet 
inconclusive on whether visual and auditory information share a limited 
capacity storage. Although interference paradigms could give us an answer 
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on the question of whether information from different modalities share a 
limited capacity storage or not, they cannot answer whether the information 
from different modalities is integrated in this single storage, or maintained as 
independent modality-specific traces. 
Thus far, research on multisensory working memory has shown that 
recall is better for cross-modal objects compared to modality-specific objects 
(Delogu et al., 2009; Goolkasian & Foos, 2005; Thompson & Paivio, 1994), 
working memory capacity is higher for cross-modal objects under certain 
circumstances (Fougnie & Marois, 2011; Saults & Cowan, 2007), and visual 
and auditory information can interfere with each other (Goolkasian & Foos , 
2005; Morey & Cowan, 2004, 2005) but not always (Cocchini et al., 2002). 
Although a performance benefit for cross-modal objects is seen as evidence 
for integration in multisensory research, in working memory research it has 
traditionally been seen as evidence that modality-specific information from 
cross-modal objects is stored in separate stores. While we cannot definitively 
conclude that cross-modal objects are stored as fully integrated objects in 
working memory, it is apparent that cross-modal information interacts in 
working memory beyond what would be expected from modality-specific 
stores. The question is: at what stage or stages in the processing stream do 
these interactions occur? 
MULTISENSORY PROCESSING, SELECTIVE ATTENTION, AND WORKING 
MEMORY 
To answer this question we turn to research on multisensory 
processing and selective attention. The insights gained from this research 
could also inform questions about working memory for multisensory stimuli. 
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In fact, more and more researchers have challenged the idea that working 
memory and attention are two separate systems (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; 
Cowan, 2001; Oberauer & Hein, 2012; Olivers, 2008; Kiyonaga & Egner, 
2013, Klaver & Talsma, 2013). For example, Olivers (2008) reviews 
evidence for the notion that working memory and attention share the same 
capacity, content and control processes, suggesting they might be two 
aspects of the same process. Likewise, Kiyonaga & Egner (2013) discuss the 
literature that examined the effects of external attention on working memory 
representations, as well as, the effects of working memory representations on 
directing selective attention. These studies indicate that a competitive 
interaction between working memory and selective attention exists, implying 
that they share a limited resource. Kiyonaga and Egner (2013) state that 
attention and working memory should no longer be regarded as two separate 
concepts, but instead as one concept, where attention can be directed 
externally (selective attention) and/ or internally (working memory). The 
idea of working memory as internal attention is in line with Cowan’s (2001) 
original idea of working memory where a capacity limited focus of attention 
can shift between different levels of processing. 
Given the above mentioned observations that working memory and 
attention are presumably two different aspects of the same underlying 
process, and considering that several studies have shown close ties between 
attention and multisensory processing, it is necessary to understand the 
implications of these ties for working memory. Instances where multisensory 
events guide and focus attention (also referred to as bottom-up effects) 
suggest an early integration of multisensory information, while instances 
where attention is needed for multisensory integration (also referred to as 
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top-down effects) are indicative of late integration processes. There is 
evidence for both types of interaction between multisensory integration and 
attention. Factors that determine the predominance of either early and/or late 
interactions between information from different modalities are for example, 
task-relevancy (e.g., Busse, Roberts, Crist, Weissman, & Woldorff, 2005), 
learned associations (e.g., Molholm, Martinez, Shpaner, & Foxe, 2007), and 
saliency (e.g., Van der Burg, Olivers, Bronkhorst, & Theeuwes, 2008).  
An example of top-down influence of attention on multisensory 
integration was given by Talsma and colleagues (e.g., Talsma & Woldorff, 
2005, Talsma, Doty, & Woldorff, 2007; Senkowski, Talsma, Herrman, 
Woldorff, 2005). Using a rapid succession of task-relevant and irrelevant 
stimuli, they found that attention could influence the integration of cross-
modal stimuli. Similarly, Alsius and colleagues (Alsius, Navarra, Campbell 
& Soto-Faraco, 2005; Alsius, Navarra, & Soto-Faraco, 2007) have shown 
that attending elsewhere diminishes participants susceptibility to the 
McGurk illusion (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). Based on these findings it 
appears that attending to the relevant, to-be-integrated stimuli is necessary to 
build a robust, integrated representation (Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, 
& Woldorff, 2010).  
However, evidence for bottom-up modulation of attention by 
multisensory integration has made it clear that multisensory processing can 
already happen in very early stages of perception (Giard & Peronnet, 1999; 
Molholm et al., 2002; Van der Burg, et al., 2011). For instance, Van der 
Burg et al. (2011) presented dynamic displays consisting of line elements 
that randomly changed orientation. When a target orientation change was 
synchronized with a short, spatially uninformative tone, visual search was 
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strongly facilitated as compared to when the tone was absent. The 
interpretation given to these results was that the tone and the synchronized 
orientation change were bound together into one coherent event, thereby 
forming a cross-modal singleton that “popped out” between the non-
synchronized visual distractors. EEG data showed that this multisensory 
benefit was apparent as early as 50 ms post-stimulus onset and that the 
strength of this effect predicted the magnitude of the behavioral benefit 
during visual search, due to the auditory signal.  
The findings above imply that both top-down (task-relevance and 
learned associations) as well as bottom-up (salience) processes are involved 
in multisensory integration. To resolve this apparent contradiction between a 
bottom-up view of multisensory processing, where early multisensory effects 
seem to drive attention, and a top-down view of multi-sensory processing, 
where attention seems to be required to integrate cross-modal objects, 
Talsma et al. (2010) proposed a unified framework of attention and 
multisensory processing. According to this framework, early pre-attentive 
processes can bind multisensory inputs together, but only when competition 
among the individual inputs is low. Thus, the early latency processes serve 
to cross-feed low-level information between the individual sensory cortices 
involved in the integration processes. Early interactions might serve to 
realign auditory and visual input signals. Auditory information might give 
temporal information to visual cortex whereas visual information might 
provide spatial information to auditory processing.  
This pre-attentive early integration would, according to Talsma et al. 
(2010), only be possible, however, if the stimuli presented in one modality 
do not need to compete for processing capacity with other stimuli in that 
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same modality. If there is competition among multiple stimuli in one 
modality, top-down attentional control may be required to filter out any 
stimulus that is not task relevant, thereby prioritizing those stimuli that are 
task relevant. Consistent with this view, Van der Burg, Olivers, and 
Theeuwes (2012) found that the earlier mentioned automatic capture by a 
synchronized cross-modal event can be modulated by the size of the 
attentional window, meaning that when participants were less focused the 
effect of the cross-modal pop out was stronger than when participants were 
forced to focus on a small cue before the synchronized cross-modal event. In 
conclusion, stimulus-driven, bottom-up processes can automatically capture 
attention towards multisensory events. Top-down attention can in turn 
facilitate the integration of multisensory information which leads to a spread 
of attention across sensory modalities.  
Based on the previously mentioned idea that external attention and 
internal attention (working memory) are two aspects of the same process, 
findings in attentional research could be applied to working memory. It has 
been shown that spatial attention can actively influence working memory 
representations by facilitating encoding (Uncapher, Hutchinson, & Wagner, 
2011) and improving the recall of memorized representations (Murray, 
Nobre, Clark, Cravo, & Stokes, 2013). These effects are found not only 
within a single modality, but also across modalities. For instance, an 
auditory cue can draw attention to a visual object and vice versa (Spence & 
Driver, 1997; Koelewijn, Bronkhorst, & Theeuwes, 2009). Similar effects 
for working memory have been found by Botta et al. (2011). They examined 
the effect of visual, auditory, and audiovisual cues on working memory for 
arrays of colored squares in a change detection task. The cross-modal and 
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modality-specific cues could either capture attention towards the hemifield 
which contained the to-be-remembered objects, or towards the opposite 
hemifield which contained the to-be-ignored objects. They found that 
audiovisual cues had a larger influence on performance accuracy than 
modality-specific visual or auditory cues. Memory accuracy was increased 
when an audiovisual cue was presented on the same side as the target and it 
was decreased when the audiovisual cue was presented on the opposite side. 
Both the facilitation and impairment of memory performance was larger for 
audiovisual cues compared to visual cues. Although these data do not 
directly address the question of how a cross-modal object is represented in 
working memory as such, they do tell us that multisensory information has a 
bottom-up effect on the subsequent memorization of a unisensory object. 
Investigation of top-down effects of working memory on attention 
has revealed that working memory content can affect the allocation of visual 
selective attention (Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006). In a multisensory 
context, Murray et al. (2004) found that discrimination accuracy of visual 
objects, presented 20 seconds after initial presentation, improved when the 
initial presentation was a picture-sound combination compared to a 
unisensory picture. EEG data revealed that the neuronal response to a cross-
modal stimulus happened as fast as 60 to 136 ms and predominantly 
influenced activation in the right lateral occipital complex. Where a 
semantically congruent picture-sound combination increased discrimination 
accuracy on a second presentation, a pure tone decreased discrimination 
accuracy on a second presentation (Lehman & Murray, 2005; Thelen, Cappe, 
& Murray, 2012). Thelen, Talsma, and Murray (in press) replicate these 
earlier findings, while also showing the same effects in the auditory 
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modality. Single-trial multisensory memories affect later auditory 
recognition. If cross-modal objects were congruent (visual and auditory 
information match semantically) accuracy was higher compared to 
unisensory stimuli but became worse if objects were incongruent or 
meaningless. Unisensory percepts seem to trigger the multisensory 
representations associated with them, suggesting at least a partially 
integrated storage in memory. Yet, it seems a multisensory representation 
stored in memory is only beneficial for memory performance when sounds 
and pictures are semantically congruent. These studies show that an internal 
representation is formed in which both the visual and auditory information is 
encoded. Moreover, they also indicate that information presented in a task 
irrelevant modality interferes with the task relevant representation. But 
although this still does not address the question of whether unisensory 
information is still accessible it does show that the original unisensory 
representations are closely related. Similar to the findings in research on 
attention and multisensory integration, it seems that top-down and bottom-up 
processes play an important part in the integration of cross-modal 
information in working memory representations.  
PREDICTIVE CODING AND MULTISENSORY WORKING MEMORY 
One influential framework that can explain the intricacies of top-
down and bottom-up interactions in multisensory memory is that of 
predictive coding. The predictive coding framework states that the brain 
produces a Bayesian estimate of the environment (Friston, 2010). According 
to this view, stochastic models of the environment exist in the brain, which 
are continuously updated on the basis of processed sensory information. 
 A MULTISENSORY PERSPECTIVE OF WORKING MEMORY    151 
Higher-order brain areas thus provide the lower areas with predictions (or in 
Bayesian terms “priors”) that influence the processing of ongoing sensory 
input. A strong mismatch between the prediction and the actual sensory 
input will then result in a major update of the internal model. Thus when we 
are in a complex environment with many stimuli competing for processing 
capacity, incongruence between the top-down predictions of the environment 
and the present incoming environmental information can determine the 
priority with which incoming stimuli need to be processed and integrated. 
The processed information changes the predictions and vise versa. Bottom-
up sensory processing and top-down predictions mutually define each other 
continuously. In this way, the predictive coding view can explain how top-
down and bottom-up processes interact in multisensory integration.  
Talsma (in revision) recently argued that the dynamic model of our 
environment provided by the aforementioned stochastic representations is 
essential to understanding the interaction between basic (multi)sensory 
processing on the one hand, and memory and attention on the other. For 
instance, Vetter, Smith, and Muckli (2014) showed that actual auditory 
stimulation as well as imagined sounds could activate the visual cortex. 
Based on the predictive coding framework, these authors argued that visual 
cortex activation came about because either direct sensory information or a 
stored memory representation thereof could update the internal 
representation of the sound and therefore indirectly influence processing in 
visual cortex accordingly. This suggests that attention, memory, and 
multisensory processing are intrinsically intertwined. Similarly, Berger and 
Ehrsson (2013, 2014) showed that imagined sounds can mimic the effects of 
actual sounds in a number of well-known multisensory illusions, such as the 
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bounce-pass illusion (Sekuler, Sekuler, & Lau, 1997), the McGurk effect 
(McGurk and MacDonald, 1976), or the ventriloquist illusion (Howard & 
Templeton, 1966), and show independent of each other that visual cortex can 
be activated both by multisensory stimulation and by memory. Based on 
these findings, Talsma (in revision) argued that despite the fact that several 
studies showed that auditory and visual inputs can interact at very early 
processing stages, the actual integration of the sensory inputs into a coherent 
mental representation occurs at later, higher-order processing stages.  
An important consequence of applying the predictive coding 
framework is that our internal representation is assumed not only to be built 
on the basis of direct sensory input, but that it is also updated (and made 
consistent with) information stored in memory. Thus, attention is assumed to 
play an essential role in regulating how our sensory input is combined with 
these pre-existing representations stored in long-term memory. This is 
largely consistent with Cowan’s idea of the focus of attention (2001), which 
is a part of activated long-term memory, as well as with Baddeley’s episodic 
buffer (2000), although, Baddeley recently argued that attention in the form 
of the central executive was not necessary for the integration of multiple 
sources of information in the episodic buffer (Baddeley, Allen, & Hitch, 
2011). 
A further consequence of applying the predictive coding framework 
is that the internal representation is by definition always multisensory. 
Moreover, the active representation integrates all possible sources of 
information, including semantic information from long-term memory. Thus, 
even when only a unisensory stimulus is presented, associated 
representations will be activated as well. These can include information from 
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other modalities, prior experience with the stimulus, or learned associations. 
Because the formation of this internal mental representation is an active 
process that influences ongoing processes in the sensory cortices, this model 
can explain why memory traces in one modality can be strengthened or 
corrupted by traces in another one. Furthermore, because the active 
representation sends feedback information to the low-level processes in 
sensory cortices it can be assumed that the original unisensory memory 
traces are still present albeit in a relatively fragile state.  
 
MULTISENSORY WORKING MEMORY REPRESENTATIONS IN CURRENT 
MODELS 
The active internal environmental model as proposed by the 
predictive coding framework would be akin to what we would describe as a 
multisensory working memory representation. This memory representation 
does not only consist of information coming from different modalities but 
also includes information from long-term memory such as semantic 
knowledge or learned associations. Taking the previously mentioned 
example of memorizing a cat picture the multisensory representation 
includes not only the visual features of the cat, but also long-term semantic 
knowledge of cats, autobiographical knowledge (previous personal 
experience with cats), and information from modalities not presented with 
the picture (the sound a cat makes or the knowledge that its fur is soft to the 
touch). We assume that working memory has an amodal central storage 
component. Whether this is the main component of working memory as 
suggested by Cowan (2001) or a part of a bigger system like the episodic 
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buffer in Baddeley’s model (2000; Baddeley, Allen, & Hitch, 2011) remains 
a point for further investigation.  
The predictive coding framework would suggest that incoming 
sensory information is constantly used to update the internal environmental 
model, implying that incoming stimuli tend to integrate into a coherent 
multisensory representation. This framework can also explain why working 
memory is amodal in some cases and modality specific in others. For 
instance, Postle (2006) argued that working memory for modality-specific 
stimuli occurs in the sensory cortices. Recently, Yonelinas (2013) suggested 
that high-resolution bindings are stored in the hippocampus that can be used 
to support perception and working memory, specifically in memorizing 
(combinations of) complex features. In the latter case it is plausible that the 
multisensory representation will be activated, whereas in the former case it is 
not. Based on this, one important implication of the predictive coding 
approach is that differences in task and stimulus complexity can yield rather 
drastically different outcomes. With this in mind a recommendation for 
future research would be to consider effects of task and stimulus complexity 
on working memory activation.  
Based on the above mentioned framework, we assume that sensory 
cortices can retain small amounts of modality-specific information (as 
suggested by Postle, 2006) and that this information supports a multisensory 
memory representation in higher order areas (e.g., the hippocampus; 
Yonelinas, 2013). Whether working memory for a specific task involves the 
higher-order areas or the sensory areas to retain information for limited time 
depends on the task and the information that needs to be memorized. For 
example, simple flashes and beeps could be retained in the sensory areas, 
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whereas more complex information would also require the higher-order 
areas. In that sense the sensory cortices would retain information in a manner 
similar to separate slave systems (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) or the recently 
suggested peripheral storage (Cowan, Saults, & Blume, 2014). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have reviewed recent developments in multisensory 
working memory research. Research has shown that cross-modal 
information interacts in working memory beyond what would be expected 
from the traditional modality-specific stores. Recall is better for cross-modal 
objects compared to modality-specific objects (Delogu et al., 2009; 
Goolkasian & Foos, 2005; Thompson & Paivio, 1994), working memory 
capacity can be higher for cross-modal objects than for unimodal objects 
(Fougnie & Marois, 2011; Saults & Cowan, 2007), and visual and auditory 
memory can interfere with each other (Goolkasian & Foos , 2005; Morey & 
Cowan, 2004, 2005). Furthermore, multisensory information has an effect on 
the subsequent memorization of a unisensory object (Botta et al, 2011) and 
multisensory memory representations can influence subsequent unisensory 
stimulus discrimination (Lehman & Murray, 2005; Murray et al., 2004; 
Thelen, Cappe, & Murray, 2012; Thelen, Talsma, & Murray, in press). 
Taken together, these studies show that sensory representations in multiple 
modalities interact more with each other than can be explained by classical 
modal models. 
Paivio’s dual coding theory (1971, 1986) states that although cross-
modal information can interact it is in fact independent, because modality-
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specific information can still be retrieved in isolation. However, studies done 
by Thelen and colleagues (Thelen, Cappe, & Murray, 2012; Thelen, Talsma, 
& Murray, in press) show that this retrieval of modality-specific information 
from a cross-modal representation is more difficult than assumed, because a 
task irrelevant modality interferes with the task relevant representation. 
Moreover, higher-order representations of the external world built from 
memorized information have been shown to influence visual processing. 
Complex representations seem to be formed in working memory, consisting 
of the integration of several independent representations that can be sensory, 
and short- or long-term memory activations. Depending on task 
requirements either just the simple modal representation or the complex 
high-resolution binding of several features at once will become active. 
Therefore, we conclude that working memory is in essence multisensory, 
and that this must be taken into account to achieve a realistic understanding 
of how working memory processes maintain and manipulate information. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current dissertation set out to investigate how information from 
different sources is represented in working memory. One of the key 
functions of working memory -that has previously been ignored to a large 
extent in the scientific literature- is that it facilitates the integration of 
multiple features and representations of our surroundings. In our daily life, 
we experience the world through different senses and integrate the 
information stemming from these senses into a coherent representation. 
Despite the importance of these integrative mechanisms, working memory 
research has mostly focused on examining information from different 
modalities in isolation, with some suggesting that information from different 
modalities is represented in separate stores. Here, the integrative aspects of 
working memory processes were examined in two different ways. The first 
part of the dissertation focuses on integration of stimulus features within the 
visual modality, while the second part focuses on integration across 
modalities. The first major question we addressed is how individual visual 
features are represented in working memory and whether these features are 
integrated into a unified object. In the second part, we address the question 
how feature-binding processes in working memory can extend beyond the 
visual domain. More specifically, we examine the influence of auditory 
information on visual memory processing. 
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VISUAL WORKING MEMORY REPRESENTATIONS 
Whether the number of objects or the total amount of information 
imposes a limit on visual working memory capacity is still an ongoing 
debate in visual working memory literature. The object-limited view 
assumes that visual information is bound together in integrated objects and 
that a fixed number of these objects can be maintained at the same time (see 
for a review: Luck & Vogel, 2013). According to this view either all 
information of one object is represented in working memory or nothing. The 
information-limited view, on the other hand, assumes that a varying number 
of objects can be maintained dependent on the precision with which these 
objects are encoded (see for a review: Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014).  
In Chapter 2 we investigated whether visual objects could be stored 
in working memory at variable levels-of-detail. We did so by employing a 
change detection task with novel visual objects that could be memorized 
with differing degrees of precision. This task-feature allowed us to examine 
whether participants could employ some strategic control over the amount of 
detail they memorized per object. The main finding of this study was that 
visual working memory capacity was significantly affected by the amount of 
detail that had to be memorized per object. Change detection accuracy 
decreased not only as a function of the number of objects that were required 
to be memorized, but also as a function of the required level-of-detail. These 
two factors did not interact, which could suggest that object and detail 
information affected change detection performance independently. The 
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results from this experiment imply that memorizing more detail of an object 
came at the cost of being able to memorize fewer objects. Moreover, our 
results indicate that participants could strategically control the amount of 
detail they memorized per object dependent on the task instruction. Although 
we should be careful with the interpretation, for reasons outlined below, 
these results are compatible with information-limited models of working 
memory capacity. 
One limitation of the study presented in Chapter 2 is that the three 
levels-of-detail impose different limitations upon the working memory 
system. Specifically, memorizing the highest level-of-detail, that is, the 
spatial structure of each stimulus, may be contingent upon the lowest level; 
the general shape of the stimuli. To circumvent this problem we devised a 
new experiment that used a set of stimuli, which consisted of features that 
were all independent of each other. Using this multi-feature approach, we 
were able to instruct participants to selectively remember one or more of 
these features from each object. Moreover, this approach allowed us to 
investigate whether individual features were represented separately in 
working memory, or whether they are bound together into integrated object 
representations. Given the dependency of the different levels-of-detail on 
each other, this is something that we were unable to do in Chapter 2. 
 In Chapter 3 we thus examined whether multi-feature objects 
are represented as separate features or as integrated objects in visual working 
memory. Specifically, we examined the effect of feature load on visual 
working memory capacity, change detection sensitivity, and posterior slow 
wave event-related brain potential (ERP) activity during memory retention 
using a change detection task with multi-feature objects. In the two 
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experiments we conducted, we found that visual working memory capacity 
was significantly impacted by feature- as well as by object load, but found 
no interactions between these factors, suggesting that object and feature load 
modulated working memory capacity independently. Interestingly, we found 
a possible dissociation between bilateral and lateralized ERP activity during 
memorization. Bilateral delay activity decreased in amplitude when more 
features had to be memorized whereas lateralized ERP activity increased in 
amplitude when more objects had to be memorized, but only on the 
contralateral side. Together with the behavioral results, these findings 
suggest that both object information as well as separate feature information 
is represented in working memory. 
For a long time the dominant view has been that working memory 
capacity is only sensitive to object load and not the feature load of these 
objects, and, that objects are maintained with a fixed precision (e.g., Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001; Zhang & Luck, 2008). 
Clearly, our findings do not support this object-based view. We found that 
both the precision as well as the number of features of an object affected the 
number of objects that could be maintained in working memory. This 
finding is congruent with continuous resource models that assume that 
capacity is limited by the total amount visual information and the precision 
with which this information is represented (e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh. 2004; 
Bays & Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). We should be cautious, 
however, to advocate against the importance of object-based representations, 
because in each of our experiments, our results do indicate that there is a 
fixed upper limit on the number of objects that can be memorized.  
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 Indeed, it appears that object-representations as well as separate 
feature-representations contribute to limitations in visual working memory 
performance. This conclusion fits well with recent studies that have 
suggested that both object and feature representations are maintained in 
working memory (e.g., Fougnie, Asplund, & Marois, 2010; Fougnie, 
Cormiea, Kanabar, & Alvarez, 2016; Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015; Xu & 
Chun, 2006). For example, using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) Xu and Chun (2006) found that two separate systems were involved 
in visual working memory. Activity in the inferior intraparietal sulcus was 
associated with the number of objects that had to be memorized, with each 
of these objects occupying a unique spatial location. In contrast, activity in 
the superior intraparietal sulcus and lateral occipital complex was related to 
stimulus complexity and the overall amount of visual information that was 
encoded. These findings resemble our ERP data where we found that 
posterior contralateral activity was modulated by object load and posterior 
bilateral activity was modulated by feature load. In line with Xu & Chun 
(2006) and our results, Fougnie et al. (2010) devised a model that can 
explain how precision, and object and feature information interact to limit 
working memory capacity. They assume that when object load increases, the 
probability that an object is stored and the precision with which the object is 
represented decreases. The number of features will only affect the precision 
of information in the encoded objects. Thus it seems that capacity is limited 
by an upper bound in the amount of objects that can be stored but that within 
that upper bound capacity can be flexibly allocated depending on item 
complexity (see for a similar conclusion: Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004). 
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To conclude, the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 collectively show that 
both individual features of an object and the total number of objects 
determine working memory capacity. First, capacity, as measured by 
Cowan’s K, for the same objects decreased when the number of features or 
precision with which objects had to be memorized increased. Second, in both 
tasks change-detection performance, as measured by average accuracy 
(Chapter 2) and d-prime (Chapter 3), was affected by object load and feature 
load. Third, our ERP results indicate a dissociation between bilateral 
posterior activity (which shows an effect of feature load) and lateralized 
posterior activity (which shows an effect of object load) during 
memorization of multi-feature objects. Last, performance decreased when 
participants were instructed to memorize more information (precision and 
feature) which suggests that people are able to strategically control how 
visual information is encoded, maintained, and/ or retrieved. Based on our 
own findings and in agreement with recent studies in visual working 
memory literature (e.g., Fougnie et al., 2010; Fougnie et al., 2016; Vergauwe 
& Cowan, 2015; Xu & Chun, 2006), we assume that both object- and feature 
representations are simultaneously, and separately maintained in working 
memory (cf. Fougnie et al., 2010; Xu & Chun, 2006). Moreover, we assume 
that people have some strategic control over how visual information is 
encoded and maintained (cf. Fougnie et al., 2016), and retrieved (cf. 
Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015).  
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CROSS-MODAL WORKING MEMORY 
Recent advances in the field of multisensory processing have 
questioned the classical notion of modality-specific processing (Ghazanfar & 
Schroeder, 2006), by showing the existence of very rapid interactions 
between multiple sensory systems (e.g., Giard & Péronnet, 1999; Talsma, 
Doty, & Woldorff, 2007), direct pathways between the visual and auditory 
cortices (e.g., Beer, Plank, & Greenlee, 2011; Falchier, Clavagnier, Barone, 
& Kennedy, 2002), and demonstrating how early multisensory interactions 
may contribute to attentional orienting and memorization processes (e.g., 
Van der Burg, Talsma, Olivers, Hickey, & Theeuwes, 2011; Talsma, 
Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, & Woldorff, 2010). Following this, a limited 
number of studies have shown that multisensory processing might affect 
visual working memory performance. For instance, Botta et al. (2011) 
showed that multisensory cues were more effective in biasing the access of 
information in visual working memory than pure visual cues were. Likewise, 
it has been reported that memory capacity for bimodal stimuli was larger 
than that of visual or auditory stimuli (e.g., Delogu, Raffone, & Belardinelli, 
2009). Further evidence suggesting that working memory is not entirely 
modality specific, was recently provided by Senkowski, Schneider, Tandler, 
& Engel (2009), who showed that the binding of visual and auditory features 
of a memorized object are reflected in high frequency (> 40 Hz) oscillations 
in EEG waveforms. Taken together, we now have considerable evidence that 
non-visual processes can exert an influence on visual working memory 
processes. It remains a question, however, how modality specific codes and 
more abstract, contextual, forms of information interact in working memory. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 set out to address that question. More specifically, 
in Chapter 4 we focused on the question whether an irrelevant auditory 
context could influence the spatial coding with which serially presented 
visual items are represented in working memory and whether this would 
facilitate subsequent item recall. Participants were instructed to memorize 
visually presented Chinese characters in a 4-item Sternberg task. We created 
three different auditory contexts: a monotone, an ascending, and a random 
auditory context. Each Chinese character in the sequence was 
simultaneously presented with one out of four auditory tones. The tone that 
was presented at a given point in the sequence was determined by the 
auditory context. We found that processes responsible for the spatial 
recoding of nonverbal items in serial order working memory can be 
influenced by an irrelevant auditory context. We found a spatial bias based 
on the ordinal position of an item presented in a sequence but only when 
items co-occurred with an ascending auditory tone sequence. This seems to 
indicate that the auditory context needed to facilitate this repositioning has to 
consist of informative and predictable auditory stimuli. Although spatial 
encoding took place when presented with an informative and predictable 
context this did not improve item memory performance.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 we review the literature on audio-visual 
interactions and integration in working memory and attention. Despite 
evidence that has historically argued in favor of modality-specific working 
memory systems (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), Chapter 4 discusses an 
increasing body of literature suggesting that cross-modal interactions do play 
an important role in working memory. For example, studies examining 
multisensory working memory in the audiovisual domain have shown that: 
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a) recall is better for cross-modal objects compared to modality specific 
objects (Delogu, Raffone, & Belardinelli, 2009; Goolkasian and Foos, 2005; 
Thompson and Paivio, 1994); b) capacity can be higher for cross-modal 
objects (Fougnie and Marois, 2011; Saults and Cowan, 2007), and c) that 
visual and auditory information can interfere with each other (Goolkasian 
and Foos, 2005; Morey and Cowan, 2004, 2005). Moreover, the 
memorization of modality-specific objects is affected by cross-modal cues 
(Botta et al., 2011) and unisensory object discrimination is affected by a 
multisensory memory representation (e.g., Murray et al., 2004). These 
studies indicate that representations in memory can be unisensory or 
multisensory, and that both top-down and bottom-up processes play an 
important part in the integration of information. Based on the above-
mentioned findings, recent developments in neuroscientific models of 
working memory (D’Esposito & Postle, 2014; Postle, 2006), and the gaining 
popularity of the predictive coding framework (Friston, 2010), we concluded 
that a complex multisensory representation seemed to be formed in working 
memory, which consists of the integration of several independent 
representations that can be sensory, and short- or long-term activations. 
Specifically, we assume that sensory cortices maintain small amounts of 
unisensory information (cf. Postle, 2006) and that this information supports a 
multisensory representation in higher-order association areas (Postle, 2006; 
Yonelinas, 2013).  
Our conclusion that multiple representations (e.g., simple unisensory 
and integrated multisensory) can be maintained at the same time is congruent 
with our conclusion in the visual domain (Chapter 2 and 3) in the sense that 
both visual features and integrated objects can be represented 
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simultaneously. In his emergent property view, Postle (2006) suggests two 
main principles that determine active representations in working memory. 
First, information maintenance is associated with sustained activity in brain 
regions that are responsible for the processing of information in non-working 
memory related situations (e.g., perception). Second, any presented stimulus 
will activate as many representations as can be afforded by the stimulus. For 
example, a visually presented cat picture will not only activate visual 
representations but also long-term semantic and autobiographical knowledge 
of cats (previous experiences with cats), and possibly, information from 
modalities not presented with the picture (e.g., the sound a cat makes, or the 
touch of its fur). Whether working memory performance on any specific task 
is dependent on the complex multisensory representation or simple 
unisensory representations is an interesting question for future research. One 
obvious possibility is that it depends on specific task needs. In the visual 
domain, two recent studies have shown that either the feature or integrated 
object representation is active based on the task instructions that participants 
received (Fougnie et al., 2016; Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015). Similarly, in a 
cross-modal verbal-spatial task, Morey (2009) found that memory for spatial 
locations was impaired by a concurrent verbal rehearsal task when 
participants were required to maintain the verbal-spatial binding, but not 
when the task did not require verbal spatial binding. Our results are 
congruent with above-mentioned findings in that we found that participants 
were able to memorize the same objects with more detail if the task 
demanded it.  
Another possible determinant of whether the simple or complex 
representation is used is the to-be-remembered stimulus properties. For 
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example, simple beeps and flashes will only activate simple representations 
while pictures of known objects will activate a complex representation. This 
could help explain the discrepancy in visual working memory literature on 
whether features or integrated objects are the main determining factor of 
capacity. As discussed in Chapter 3, the discrepancy in results might be 
explained by the difference in visual objects used within and across tasks, 
where some objects might elicit a form of obligatory binding and others do 
not. Whether a complex representation is formed of two independent 
simultaneously presented stimuli will also depend on the stimulus properties. 
For example, in Chapter 4 we found that a complex audio-visual 
representation was only formed if the auditory stimulus was both 
informative and predictable. This is consistent with research in the 
multisensory integration field, which shows that integration of multiple 
sources of information is dependent on amongst other things; task relevancy 
(e.g., Busse, Roberts, Crist, Weissman, & Woldorff, 2005), saliency (Van 
der Burg, Olivers, Bronkhorst, & Theeuwes, 2008), and predictability 
(Fiebelkorn et al., 2011). Based on the evidence put forward in the current 
dissertation, we assume that multiple representations exist in working 
memory and that the activation of specific representations is in large part 
determined by task instructions and stimulus properties.  
THE FUTURE OF WORKING MEMORY RESEARCH 
The current dissertation is not without its limits. While we assume 
that multiple representations exist in working memory, it is important to note 
that these assumptions are mostly based on our findings in the visual domain 
(Chapter 2 and 3) and a review of literature in the audio-visual domain 
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(Chapter 5). More specific hypothesis testing is required to confirm our 
assumptions and to determine how this extends to findings in other domains.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, the main focus was on whether precision and 
feature load could affect visual working memory capacity. We found that 
both precision and feature load decreased the number of objects that could 
be memorized simultaneously. In Chapter 2, however, the effect of level-of-
detail was possibly confounded with test uncertainty due to the nature of the 
multi-feature objects used and the possible changes that could occur on test. 
Specifically, when participants had to report a change in the color of an 
object, reporting that no color change had occurred when the spatial 
locations of colors had changed was significantly more difficult, as 
suggested by the increase in errors in this condition. How irrelevant features 
impact encoding, maintenance, and retrieval in a change-detection task has 
largely been unexplored with earlier studies showing mixed results. For 
example, Woodman, Vogel, and Luck (2012) found no evidence that change 
detection performance was affected by irrelevant size or location changes, 
while others have shown that irrelevant features affected change detection 
performance when relevant memory load was low (Xu, 2010), or when the 
retention interval was short (<500 ms, Logie, Brockmole, & Jaswal, 2010). 
Comparing relevant and irrelevant information and how they affect working 
memory performance could be a fruitful line of research to examine 
information binding in visual working memory. 
In both Chapters 2 and 3 we found that both the number of objects 
and the amount detail (or number of features) memorized per object affected 
change detection performance. Because we found no interaction between 
object load and information load we concluded that both affected capacity 
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independently. Although we must be careful to make any strong assumptions 
based on a null result, we did find the same effect in three separate 
experiments. Moreover, the dissociation between bilateral and lateralized 
ERP activity seems to indicate that multiple representations coexist. The 
dissociation between bilateral and lateralized posterior ERP activity raises 
some interesting questions. First, it needs to be determined whether the 
bilateral activity is indeed due to processes in memorization or whether it is 
an artifact of low level and early perceptual processing as suggested by 
Vogel and Machizawa (2004). Secondly, if we consider CDA activity to 
represent integrated objects, could it possibly be influenced by other non-
visual sources of information? Although earlier work employing the CDA 
has emphasized the role of visual brain areas in working memory (e.g., 
Klaver, Talsma, Wijers, Heinze, & Mulder, 1999; Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004), subsequent work has provided reasons to question whether working 
memory operates on pure modality specific (e.g. visual) contents. Firstly, 
Diamantopoulou et al. (2011) recently showed that the CDA amplitude is 
more sensitive to memory load manipulations when the material that is to be 
memorized consists of multiple discrete categories than when it consisted of 
visually more demanding continuous variations of the same category. This 
somewhat counterintuitive result is hard to explain in terms of pure visual 
processes driving these occipital activations. Thus, this finding was 
interpreted to imply that the occipital CDA component reflects the 
association between pure visual processes and a more abstract semantic form 
of categorical coding, presumably representing a process binding the 
categorical information to a visual code. If this is the case, then memory 
involves binding together multiple features and objects. Our results are 
compatible with these findings in the sense that they also underscore the 
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finding that the CDA is sensitive to other factors than just the storage of 
individual stimulus features. A potential interesting line of research could 
examine whether CDA activity represents purely visual integrated objects or 
whether it is a more general representation of integrated objects that could 
also contain information from long-term memory and/ or other modalities. 
Multisensory Working Memory 
 Overall, we believe that the study of multisensory working 
memory could bring important new insights on how working memory 
processes help integrate information from multiple sources at once to assist 
in daily functioning. It can help answer the question how and where 
information in working memory is represented and maintained. One 
important aspect that has been overlooked in working memory research is 
the difference between what we earlier described as the format, i.e., the 
sensory modality in which the information is perceived and/ or processed 
(e.g., auditory or visual), and the content, i.e., the actual information that is 
transferred (e.g., verbal or non-verbal), of working memory representations 
(Chapter 5). For example, a specific cat picture (visual format) can be 
memorized in multiple ways: a visual representation of the cat picture (visual 
content), a verbal description of the cat picture (verbal content), or the 
simultaneous activation of all concepts related to the cat picture 
(multisensory content: visual representation of the cat picture, a verbal 
description of the cat picture, and long-term representations of cat related 
concepts). Examining under what circumstances different content 
representations are active and what limits, if any, the number of 
representations that can be active at one time can help us achieve a unified 
working memory model. 
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 Current working memory models can account for the storage of 
multisensory information in different ways and addressing the above 
mentioned question can allow us to differentiate between these models. For 
example, both Baddeley (2000) and Cowan (2001) assume that multisensory 
information is stored in the form of a limited number of integrated chunks in 
an amodal format, in the episodic buffer and focus of attention respectively. 
Although these models have similar assumptions on how multisensory 
information is maintained, they will generate different predictions on how 
information enters and exits this amodal maintenance (e.g., information 
being transferred from modality specific stores or by shifting attention in 
activated long-term representations). 
 The integration of information from different sources is an 
important aspect of working memory and understanding under which 
specific circumstances information is integrated or not and how this 
information is represented and maintained is crucial if we are to further our 
understanding of working memory processes. As a last point, one interesting 
option is to approach working memory research in light of the predictive 
coding framework. The predictive coding framework has the potential to 
explain many of the apparent discrepancies between modality specific and 
multimodal accounts of working memory, as it explains how working 
memory representations are composed of both a modality specific 
component, that is mainly represented in the functional feedback (or 
anatomical feedforward) representations, while the multimodal 
representation is mainly carried by the functional feedforward (or 
antatomical feedback) representation (see Talsma, 2015 for a discussion).  
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 Here we present some important questions raised by the current 
dissertation that need to be addressed in the future. How can current working 
memory models explain multisensory interactions and the apparent 
flexibility with which people can shift between unisensory and multisensory 
representations? Under which circumstances is working memory 
performance determined by unisensory or multisensory representations? And 
lastly, in the audiovisual domain, under which circumstances will 
audiovisual information facilitate or interfere with working memory 
performance? 
 To conclude, the present dissertation has shown that, both 
information load (feature load and precision) and object load affect working 
memory performance and that both are represented in working memory 
separately. Moreover, it has shown that visual and auditory information can 
interact and integrate to create a complex, multisensory representation. 
Depending on the context either just the simple modal representation or the 
complex high-resolution binding of several features at once will become 
active. We conclude that a deeper understanding of multisensory processes 
in working memory is needed to further our understanding on how 
information is encoded, maintained, and manipulated in working memory. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Werkgeheugen is onze vaardigheid om gedurende een korte tijd, een 
beperkte hoeveelheid informatie te onthouden wanneer deze informatie niet 
meer fysiek aanwezig is. Hoewel deze vaardigheid vrij eenvoudig lijkt, stelt 
het ons in staat om een breed scala aan complexe taken en activiteiten uit te 
voeren. Stel je voor dat je op de stoep van een drukke straat staat. Je hebt 
honger en besluit om een sandwich te kopen bij een winkel aan de overkant 
van de straat. Om de sandwich te kunnen kopen, moet je de straat 
oversteken, de winkel ingaan en de sandwich kopen. Voor en tijdens het 
oversteken van de straat moet je het verkeer om je heen goed in de gaten 
houden: auto’s naderen van links en rechts, en om je heen lopen mensen in 
alle richtingen doorelkaar. Je kijkt naar links en je ziet een naderende auto, 
tegelijkertijd hoor je de sirene van een van rechts naderende ambulance. Op 
dit moment ben je een aantal dingen actief aan het bijhouden: de naderende 
auto van links, de naderende ambulance van rechts, je doel om de sandwich 
te kopen, en het plan om de straat over te steken en de winkel binnen te 
gaan. Het is niet moeilijk om te zien hoe een falen van het werkgeheugen 
kan leiden tot problemen in het dagelijkse leven. Het is dan ook geen 
verrassing dat het werkgeheugen, en de bijbehorende processen, op de 
voorgrond staat van het onderzoek naar menselijke cognitie.  
De informatie die wij onthouden in het werkgeheugen komt uit een 
grote verscheidenheid aan bronnen: zintuiglijke informatie (bv., de visueel 
waarneembare auto of auditief waargenomen ambulance), motorische en 
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actie informatie (bv., de geplande actie om de straat over te steken), en het 
lange-termijn geheugen (bv., de begrippen "straat", "auto", "ambulance" en 
"bakker"). Dus naast het kort onthouden van informatie, is de integratie van 
informatie uit de verschillende, bovengenoemde bronnen een belangrijk 
aspect van het werkgeheugen.  
Ondanks het belang van de integratie van informatie uit 
verschillende bronnen heeft onderzoek in het werkgeheugen veld zich vooral 
gericht op het onthouden van informatie uit een enkele bron. Hoe informatie 
wordt geïntegreerd en gerepresenteerd wordt in het werkgeheugen is het 
centrale thema van dit proefschrift. Het eerste deel van het huidige 
proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2 en 3) onderzoekt hoe visuele informatie wordt 
geïntegreerd en gerepresenteerd in het werkgeheugen. Het tweede deel 
(hoofdstuk 4 en 5) onderzoekt hoe informatie afkomstig van verschillende 
zintuigen en het lange-termijn geheugen samenkomen en integreren met 
elkaar. 
VISUEEL WERKGEHEUGEN 
Een langlopende discussie in het onderzoek naar visueel 
werkgeheugen heeft betrekking op de vraag hoe visuele informatie precies 
wordt onthouden in het werkgeheugen. Sommige onderzoekers hebben 
aangetoond dat visuele informatie die bij elkaar hoort wordt samen gevoegd 
in de vorm van een aantal visuele objecten. Volgens deze onderzoekers 
wordt het visueel werkgeheugen beperkt door een vast aantal van deze 
geïntegreerde objecten die gelijktijdig in het werkgeheugen vast gehouden 
kunnen worden (Object-gelimiteerd werkgeheugen; zie voor een overzicht: 
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Luck & Vogel, 2013). Andere onderzoekers hebben aangetoond dat visuele 
kenmerken van objecten (bv., de kleur of vorm) onafhankelijk van elkaar 
onthouden kunnen worden en dat deze informatie dus niet noodzakelijk 
wordt geïntegreerd in een enkel object. Deze laatste groep onderzoekers 
stellen dat het visueel werkgeheugen niet wordt beperkt door een vast aantal 
objecten dat onthouden kan worden, maar door de totale aangeboden visuele 
informatie (Informatie-gelimiteerd werkgeheugen; zie voor een overzicht: 
Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014). Een assumptie die voortkomt uit de laatste 
stelling is dat het aantal objecten dat tegelijkertijd onthouden kan worden in 
het visueel werkgeheugen afhangt van de precisie waarmee deze objecten 
verwerkt worden. 
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we onderzocht of visuele objecten in het 
werkgeheugen verwerkt kunnen worden op verschillende niveaus van detail. 
We deden dit door gebruik te maken van een veranderings-detectie taak 
waarbij proefpersonen werden geïnstrueerd om dezelfde visuele figuren te 
onthouden met verschillende niveaus van detail. Zo konden ze geïnstrueerd 
worden om enkel de vorm van figuur te onthouden, of bijvoorbeeld, de vorm 
en de kleur van object te onthouden. De belangrijkste bevinding van deze 
studie was dat de capaciteit van het visueel werkgeheugen aanzienlijk werd 
beïnvloed door de hoeveelheid detail die onthouden moest worden per 
figuur. De nauwkeurigheid waarmee proefpersonen een verandering konden 
detecteren daalde niet alleen door het aantal objecten dat onthouden moest 
worden, maar ook door de hoeveelheid detail die onthouden moest worden 
per figuur. We vonden geen interactie tussen het aantal figuren en de 
hoeveelheid detail die verwerkt moest worden, wat suggereert dat deze 
factoren onafhankelijk van elkaar opereren. De resultaten van dit experiment 
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impliceren dat het onthouden van meer detail per figuur ten koste gaat van 
het aantal figuren dat onthouden kan worden. Bovendien geven onze 
resultaten aan dat proefpersonen, tot op zekere hoogte, strategisch konden 
bepalen hoeveel detail ze onthielden per object, afhankelijk van de 
taakinstructie. Hoewel we voorzichtig moeten zijn met de interpretatie, om 
redenen die hieronder uiteengezet zullen worden, zijn deze resultaten 
compatibel met informatie-gelimiteerde modellen van werkgeheugen 
capaciteit.  
Een beperking van de studie in hoofdstuk 2 is dat de drie 
verschillende niveaus van detail elkaar wederzijds konden beïnvloeden. Zo 
bracht een verandering in het laagste niveau van detail, de algemene vorm 
van de figuur, ook een verandering teweeg in het hoogste niveau van detail, 
de interne ruimtelijke structuur van het figuur. Om dit probleem te omzeilen 
bedachten we een nieuw experiment met nieuwe stimuli waarbij de visuele 
kenmerken van de figuur (bv., de vorm of kleur) onafhankelijk 
gemanipuleerd konden worden. Door deze aanpak konden we deelnemers 
instrueren om selectief één of meer van deze visuele kenmerken per object te 
onthouden. Bovendien konden wij op deze manier onderzoeken of de visuele 
kenmerken van een figuur afzonderlijk in het werkgeheugen 
vertegenwoordigd zijn, of dat ze met elkaar verbonden worden in een enkele, 
geïntegreerde object voorstelling.  
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we of de visuele kenmerken van een 
figuur onafhankelijk van elkaar worden onthouden, of dat deze worden 
onthouden als een geïntegreerde representatie in het visueel werkgeheugen. 
Daarnaast wilden wij de impact van visuele kenmerken op posterieure 
hersen activiteit onderzoeken met behulp van elektro-encefalografie (EEG). 
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In twee experimenten vonden we dat het aantal visuele kenmerken dat per 
object onthouden moest worden een significante impact heeft op de 
capaciteit van het visueel werkgeheugen. Het onthouden van meerdere 
visuele kenmerken per figuur ging ten koste van het totaal aantal figuren dat 
onthouden kon worden. Ook vonden we een mogelijke dissociatie tussen 
bilaterale en gelateralizeerde EEG activiteit tijdens het onthouden van 
figuren met meerdere visuele kenmerken. Bilaterale activiteit nam af in 
amplitude wanneer meer kenmerken onthouden moesten worden, terwijl 
gelateralizeerde EEG activiteit toenam in amplitude wanneer er meer figuren 
onthouden moesten worden, maar enkel aan de contralaterale zijde. Samen 
met de eerder genoemde gedrags-resultaten suggereren deze bevindingen dat 
zowel objectinformatie alsmede de visuele kenmerken per figuur 
afzonderlijk worden gerepresenteerd in het werkgeheugen. 
Kortom, de studies in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 tonen aan dat zowel de 
individuele kenmerken van een figuur alsmede het totaal aantal figuren dat 
onthouden moet worden het visueel werkgeheugen beperken. Als eerste, 
geheugen capaciteit voor dezelfde voorwerpen, zoals gemeten met Cowan’s 
K, neemt af wanneer het aantal kenmerken of de nauwkeurigheid waarmee 
figuren onthouden moeten worden wordt verhoogd. Ten tweede, in beide 
studies nam de prestatie van proefpersonen af met een toename in zowel het 
aantal figuren alsmede de totale visuele informatie (precisie of kenmerken) 
die onthouden moest worden. Ten derde, onze EEG resultaten wijzen op een 
scheiding in de posterieure hersenactiviteit tussen de bilaterale activiteit, die 
een effect van de totale visuele informatie in geheugen laat zien, en de 
gelateralizeerde activiteit, die een effect van het totaal aantal figuren in 
geheugen laat zien. Als laatste, de prestatie van deelnemers nam af wanneer 
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zij werden geïnstrueerd om meer informatie (precisie en kenmerken) te 
onthouden, dit suggereert dat ze in staat waren om strategisch te bepalen hoe 
visuele informatie werd gecodeerd, onderhouden en / of opgehaald werd in 
het werkgeheugen. 
Op basis van onze eigen bevindingen en in overeenstemming met 
recente studies (bv., Fougnie et al, 2010; Fougnie et al, 2016; Vergauwe & 
Cowan, 2015; Xu & Chun, 2006), gaan we ervan uit dat zowel een object 
representatie alsmede een kenmerken representatie afzonderlijk worden 
onthouden in het werkgeheugen (Fougnie et al, 2010; Xu & Chun, 2006). 
Bovendien gaan we ervan uit dat mensen strategische controle kunnen 
uitoefenen over hoe visuele informatie wordt gecodeerd en onthouden 
(Fougnie et al., 2016), en opgehaald (Vergauwe & Cowan, 2015). 
MULTISENSORISCH WERKGEHEUGEN 
Recente ontwikkelingen op het gebied van multisensorische 
verwerking hebben het klassieke idee dat wergeheugen representaties 
modaliteitsspecifiek zijn, in twijfel getrokken (Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 
2006). Zo bestaan er bijvoorbeeld zeer snelle interacties tussen de 
verschillende sensorische systemen (bv., Giard & Péronnet 1999; Talsma, 
Doty, & Woldorff, 2007), directe verbindingen tussen de visuele en 
auditieve cortex (bv., Beer, Plank, en Greenlee, 2011; Falchier, Clavagnier, 
Barone, & Kennedy, 2002), en vroege multisensorische interacties die 
invloed uitoefenen op het oriënteren van aandacht en geheugenopslag (bv., 
Van der Burg, Talsma, Olivers, Hickey & Theeuwes, 2011; Talsma, 
Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, & Woldorff, 2010). Ook hebben een beperkt aantal 
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studies aangetoond dat multisensorische verwerking van invloed kan zijn op 
de prestaties van het visueel werkgeheugen. Botta et al. (2011) toonde 
bijvoorbeeld aan dat multisensorische aanwijzingen effectiever zijn bij het 
sturen van selectie in visueel werkgeheugen dan pure visuele aanwijzingen 
waren. Ook is gevonden dat geheugencapaciteit voor bimodale stimuli groter 
is dan die van enkel visuele of auditieve stimuli (bijvoorbeeld Delogu, 
Raffone & Belardinelli, 2009). Verdere aanwijzingen dat werkgeheugen niet 
geheel modaliteit specifiek is werden onlangs gevonden door Senkowski, 
Schneider, Tandler, en Engel (2009), die aantoonden dat de binding van 
visuele en auditieve kenmerken van een opgeslagen object tot oscillaties van 
hoge frequentie (> 40 hz) in het EEG vertonen. Tezamen resulteren deze 
studies in een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid bewijs dat niet-visuele processen een 
invloed kunnen uitoefenen op visueel werkgeheugen processen. Het blijft 
echter nog een vraag hoe modaliteitsspecifieke informatie en meer abstracte, 
contextuele vormen van informatie samenkomen in het werkgeheugen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 hebben wij een poging gedaan om die vraag te 
beantwoorden. In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we ons gericht op de vraag of een 
irrelevant auditieve context de ruimtelijke codering kan beïnvloeden 
waarmee serieel gepresenteerde visuele items zijn vertegenwoordigd in het 
werkgeheugen en of dit vervolgens werkgeheugen prestatie kan verbeteren. 
Proefpersonen kregen de opdracht om visueel gepresenteerde Chinese 
karakters te onthouden in een Sternberg geheugentaak. We hebben drie 
verschillende auditieve contexten gecreëerd: een monotone, een opgaande en 
een willekeurige auditieve context. Elk Chinees karakter in de reeks werd 
gelijktijdig gepresenteerd met één van de vier auditieve tonen. De toon die 
werd gepresenteerd op een moment in de seriële orde werd bepaald door de 
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auditieve context. We vonden dat de ruimtelijke hercodering van Chinese 
karakters in seriële orde kan worden beïnvloed door een irrelevant auditieve 
context. We vonden dat de respons van proefpersonen werd beïnvloed door 
de ordinale positie van een karakter in de reeks, maar alleen wanneer deze 
karakters samen werden gepresenteerd met een oplopende auditieve 
tonenreeks. We concluderen dat de ruimtelijke her-codering van visueel 
gepresenteerde figuren enkel gebeurd wanneer de auditieve context bestaat 
uit informatieve en voorspelbare tonen. Alhoewel de informatieve en 
voorspelbare auditieve context de ruimtelijke codering beïnvloede zorgde dit 
niet voor een verbetering van geheugen prestaties. 
Tenslotte wordt in hoofdstuk 5 de literatuur over audio-visuele 
interacties en integratie in het werkgeheugen en aandacht besproken. 
Ondanks dat onderzoek in het verleden heeft gepleit voor modaliteit-
specifieke werkgeheugen systemen (bv., Baddeley en Hitch, 1974), 
bespreken we in hoofdstuk 4 een toenemende hoeveelheid literatuur die 
suggereert dat cross-modale interacties een belangrijke rol spelen in het 
werkgeheugen. Studies naar audiovisueel werkgeheugen hebben 
bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat: a) recall beter is voor audiovisuele objecten 
dan voor enkel auditieve- of visuele objecten (Delogu, Raffone, & 
Belardinelli, 2009 Goolkasian en Foos, 2005; Thompson en Paivio, 1994); b) 
werkgeheugencapaciteit hoger is voor audiovisuele objecten (Fougnie en 
Marois, 2011; Saults en Cowan 2007) en c), dat visuele en auditieve 
informatie kunnen interfereren met elkaar in werkgeheugen (Goolkasian en 
Foos, 2005; Morey en Cowan, 2004, 2005). Bovendien wordt het 
memoriseren van modaliteit-specifieke objecten beïnvloed door cross-
modale cues (Botta et al., 2011) en wordt modaliteitsspecifieke object 
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discriminatie beïnvloed door een multi-sensorische geheugenrepresentatie 
(bv., Murray et al., 2004). Deze studies geven aan dat de representaties in het 
geheugen unisensorisch of multisensorisch kunnen zijn, en dat zowel top-
down en bottom-up processen een belangrijke rol spelen bij de integratie van 
informatie. Op basis van de bovenstaande bevindingen, recente 
ontwikkelingen in neurowetenschappelijke modellen van het werkgeheugen 
(D'Esposito & Postle, 2014; Postle, 2006) en de populariteit van het 
predictive coding kader (Friston, 2010), concluderen wij dat een complexe 
multi-sensorische representatie wordt gecreëerd in het werkgeheugen, die 
bestaat uit de integratie van verschillende onafhankelijke representaties. 
Concreet gaan we ervan uit dat de sensorische cortices kleine hoeveelheden 
unisensorische informatie vast houden (cf. Postle, 2006) en dat deze 
informatie een multi-sensorische representatie in hogere orde hersen 
gebieden ondersteunt (Postle, 2006; Yonelinas, 2013). 
Tot slot, het huidige proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat zowel totale 
visueel informatie (visuele kenmerken en precisie) en het aantal 
geïntegreerde objecten een invloed hebben op werkgeheugen prestaties en 
dat beide onafhankelijk van elkaar worden gerepresenteerd in het 
werkgeheugen. Bovendien hebben we aangetoond dat visuele en auditieve 
informatie samen kunnen komen en integreren om een complexe, multi-
sensorische representatie te creëren. Afhankelijk van de context wordt enkel 
de eenvoudige modale representatie of de complexe binding van 
verschillende kenmerken tegelijk actief. We concluderen dat een dieper 
begrip van multi-sensorische processen in het werkgeheugen nodig is om 
onze kennis over de manier waarop informatie wordt gecodeerd, 
onderhouden en gemanipuleerd in het werkgeheugen te bevorderen. 
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